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Abstract  
What  explains  the  unexpected,  uneven,  but  unquestionably  pervasive  trend  towards  re-­‐familialization  in  
the  rich  OECD  countries?  The  usual  arguments  about  political  responses  to  rising  income  inequality,  
unstable  families,  and  unstable  employment  predicted  that  the  state  would  increasingly  shelter  people  
against  risk,  producing  greater  individuation  and  de-­‐  rather  than  re-­‐familialization.  By  contrast,  we  argue  
three  things.  First,  re-­‐familialization  has  replaced  de-­‐familialization.  Second,  unequal  access  to  housing  
drives  a  large  part  of  re-­‐familialization.  Rather  than  becoming  more  ‘anglo-­‐nordic,’  countries  are  
becoming  more  ‘southern  european’  in  the  way  that  younger  cohorts  access  housing.  Third,  this  
inequality  driven  insecurity  and  unequal  access  is  felt  differently  not  only  between  generational  cohorts  
but  also  within  cohorts.    
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No  Exit:    Social  reproduction  in  an  era  of  rising  income  inequality  
“Qué  pasa?  Qué  pasa?  Que  aùn  no  tenemos  casa!”  
Chant  by  youth  at  political  rallies  in  Spain,  2007-­‐2015  
  
“The  rent  is  too  damn  high!”  
Jimmy  McMillan,  November  2010  
  
What  explains  the  unexpected,  uneven,  but  unquestionably  pervasive  trend  towards  re-­‐familialization  in  
the  rich  OECD  countries?  The  usual  arguments  about  political  responses  to  rising  income  inequality,  
unstable  families,  and  unstable  employment  predicted  that  the  state  would  increasingly  shelter  people  
against  risk,  producing  greater  individuation  and  de-­‐  rather  than  re-­‐familialization.  By  contrast,  we  argue  
three  things.  First,  the  secular  trend  in  the  rich  OECD  countries  over  the  past  three  decades  has  largely  
been  towards  re-­‐familialization  rather  than  de-­‐familialization.  Second,  state  tax  and  housing  policies  
that  have  encouraged  the  use  of  home  equity  as  a  pension  and  welfare  substitute  have  combined  with  
income  inequality  to  create  unequal  access  to  housing.  This  drives  a  large  part  of  re-­‐familialization.  
Rather  than  becoming  more  ‘anglo-­‐nordic,’  countries  are  becoming  more  ‘southern  european’  in  the  
way  that  younger  cohorts  access  housing.  Third,  this  inequality  driven  insecurity  and  unequal  access  is  
felt  differently  not  only  between  generational  cohorts  but  also  within  cohorts.    
Put  simply,  in  the  millennial  cohort,  exit  from  the  parental  home  increasingly  requires  
supplementing  own  wages  with  parental  resources.  In  the  near-­‐retirement  cohort,  fragile  pensions  
induce  some  households  who  anticipate  an  exit  from  work  to  acquire  rental  housing,  locking  some  
millennials  out  of  ownership.  This  co-­‐constitutes  some  millennials  as  renters  and  some  pensioners  as  
landlords.  But  this  is  only  one  of  several  possible  outcomes,  because  co-­‐constitutive  processes  also  
operate  inside  each  cohort.  Millennials  who  successfully  acquire  property  bid  up  housing  prices,  locking  
other  millennials  out  of  ownership.  Pensioners  pursuing  strategies  of  individual  self-­‐insurance  both  bid  
up  housing  prices  by  acquiring  rental  properties  and  weaken  the  political  constituency  defending  secure  
pensions.  Despite  this  heterogeneity  within  and  across  cohorts,  rising  income  inequality  is  driving  the  
general  trend  towards  re-­‐familialization,  that  is,  a  pooling  of  risk  abatement  inside  the  family.  In  this  
paper,  we  generate  some  preliminary  data  documenting  both  this  overarching  trend  and  its  internal  
heterogeneity,  and  provide  a  conceptual  framework  explaining  each.    
This  analysis  has  theoretical  and  policy  implications.  We  address  and  correct  two  different  
literatures.  The  first  literature  incorrectly  predicts  continued  de-­‐familialization.  The  second  literature  
only  sees  generational  conflict  in  terms  of  ‘Generation  Rent’  and  ‘Generation  Landlord,’  while  reality  is  
both  more  complex  and  not  simply  one  of  inter-­‐generational  conflict.  Our  findings  also  inform  policy  
responses  to  three  substantive  inequalities  that  represent  major  life  stages  at  the  personal,  human  level:    
inequality  of  access  to  homeownership,  inequality  of  access  to  secure  pensions,  and  inequality  in  the  
timing  of  family  formation  and  composition  of  family  structure.    
Analysts  ranging  from  feminist  to  non-­‐feminist  expected  and  advocated  a  Polanyian  
countermovement  against  the  fragmentation  of  stable  families  and  stable  employment  that  would  take  
the  form  of  greater  state  spending  in  support  of  social  reproduction.1  Instead,  state  policy  shifted  away  
from  the  socialization  of  risk  and  encouragement  of  mass  homeownership  and  towards  the  privatization  
                                               
1  See  Chiara  Saraceno,  “Family  Change,  Family  Policies  and  the  Restructuring  of  Welfare,”  pp.  81-­‐100  in  Family,  
Market  and  Community  (Paris:  OECD,  1997)  and  Julia  S.  O'Connor,  Ann  Shola  Orloff,  Sheila  Shaver,  States,  Markets,  
Families:  Gender,  Liberalism  and  Social  Policy  in  Australia,  Canada,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  (Cambridge:  
Cambridge  University  Press,  1999)  for  the  former  and  Wolfgang  Streeck,  “Flexible  Employment,  Flexible  Families,  
and  the  Socialization  of  Reproduction,”  working  paper  WP-­‐09-­‐13  (Cologne:  Max  Planck  Institute  for  Social  Science,  
2009)  for  the  latter.  
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and  individuation  of  risk.  People  reacted  to  employment  and  welfare  policies  de-­‐socializing  risk  by  re-­‐
pooling  risk-­‐abatement  inside  family  units.  Put  simply,  the  recent  squeeze  on  the  state  and  market  parts  
of  the  welfare  balloon  has  caused  the  family  side  to  bulge  outwards.  Much  of  the  action  here  occurred  
through  the  housing  market.    
Houses  are  boxes.  But  housing  systems  –  who  gets  mortgages,  how,  and  what  kind;  who  builds  
housing,  where,  and  what  kind;  who  owns  housing;  the  degree  to  which  housing  access  is  commodified  
–  are  deeply  political.2  On  the  one  hand,  housing  systems  are  a  dependent  variable  reflecting  struggles  
over  access  to  wealth  formation,  preservation  of  racial  or  social  privilege,  and  state  efforts  to  create  or  
maintain  social  order.  On  the  other  hand,  much  research  focuses  on  how  housing  wealth  and  patterns  of  
occupation  shape  preferences  over  redistribution  and  the  welfare  state,  or  over  gender  and  family  
relations.3  
Here,  instead,  we  ask  how  rising  income  and  wealth  inequality  drives  the  shift  from  de-­‐  to  re-­‐
familialization  as  younger  cohorts  seek  to  exit  the  parental  household  and  aging  parents  seek  to  exit  
work  into  retirement.  The  general  trend  towards  re-­‐familialization  contains  several  important  
components.  Younger  cohorts’  access  to  housing  is  mediated  by  their  own  earnings  and  the  level  of  
parental  support  they  receive.  Four  decades  of  rising  income  inequality  have  widened  dispersion  in  both  
sets  of  resources.  Rising  income  inequality  has  also  limited  older  cohorts’  ability  to  save  for  retirement.  
Increasingly  unstable  and  inadequate  access  to  stable  pensions  drives  some  members  of  older  cohorts  
to  supplement  pensions  by  using  housing  as  an  additional  financial  resource.  Differing  access  to  
resources  produces  heterogeneity  inside  each  cohort.  And  differing  sub-­‐cohort  trajectories  create  co-­‐
constitutive  dynamics  that  manifest  themselves  in  re-­‐familialization.  For  example,  at  the  household  
level,  re-­‐familialization  can  occur  at  both  ends  of  the  age  distribution,  as  income-­‐constrained  children  
remain  in  or  return  to  the  parental  home,  and  as  aging  and  income  constrained  parents  either  move  in  
with  children  or  rely  on  children’s  income.  This  income  pooling  sustains  a  given  standard  of  living  for  
both  groups.  
Three  notes  of  caution  here:  Re-­‐familialization  is  occurring  in  a  context  of  an  increasing  share  of  
single  person  households.  But  these  households  are  increasingly  also  financially  dependent  on  parental  
and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  adult  children’s  resources.  We  broaden  the  concept  of  re-­‐familialization  to  
encompass  not  just  physical  co-­‐location  but  also  a  level  of  financial  dependence  that  is  considerably  
higher  than  before  1980.  That  said,  multi-­‐generational,  physical  co-­‐location  is  also  rising  across  the  
OECD.  We  aim  to  provide  a  more  fine-­‐grained  analysis  of  these  processes.    
Second,  much  of  the  literature  on  de-­‐familialization  addresses  the  question  of  whether  women  
can  form  households  independent  of  a  male  partner  or  father  in  the  context  of  a  given  welfare  regime.4  
Single  person  households  cannot  split  the  cost  of  housing  over  multiple  earners,  so  house  prices,  wages,  
and  parental  resources  matter  even  more  for  women's  ability  to  remain  independent  from  a  male  
partner.  Notwithstanding,  young  women  exit  earlier  and  more  often  than  men  everywhere  these  days,  
possibly  reflecting  the  erosion  of  traditional  well-­‐paying  low-­‐  to  medium-­‐skill  jobs  in  manufacturing  and  
construction  for  men.  In  other  words,  the  use  of  the  term  de-­‐familialization  in  referencing  women's  role  
in  the  second  nuclear  family  is  compatible  with  our  use  of  the  term  re-­‐familialization  in  referencing  a  
return  to  reliance  on  the  original  nuclear  family.  However,  we  focus  on  the  broader  dynamic  within  the  
                                               
2  Manuel  Aalbers  and  Brett  Christophers,  “Centring  housing  in  political  economy,”  Housing,  Theory  and  Society  31,  
no.  4  (2014):  373-­‐394;  Richard  Rothstein,  The  Color  of  Law:  The  Forgotten  History  of  How  Our  Government  
Segregated  America  (New  York,  NY:  WW  Norton  &  Company,  2017).  
3  Ben  Ansell,  “The  Political  Economy  of  Ownership:  Housing  Markets  and  the  Welfare  State,”  American  Political  
Science  Review  108,  no.  2  (2014):  383-­‐402;  Dolores  Hayden,  Redesigning  the  American  Dream:  The  Future  of  
Housing,  Work,  and  Family  Life  (New  York,  NY:  WW  Norton  &  Company,  2002).  
4  see  e.g.  O'Connor,  Orloff,  and  Shaver,  States,  Markets,  Families.  
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entire  younger  cohort,  because  we  seek  to  disaggregate  within-­‐cohort  outcomes.  Equally  so,  we  focus  
on  the  relatively  understudied  housing  part  of  the  welfare  regime.  
Third,  immigration  status,  racial  bias,  and  culture  all  matter  for  the  ability  and  desire  to  exit  the  
parental  household.  But  these  factors  are  either  causally  insufficient  or  have  contradictory  effects.  
Below  we  show  that  the  proportion  of  millennials  remaining  in  the  parental  household  rose  everywhere.  
Culture  might  explain  differences  in  the  proportion  across  countries,  but  not  the  general  increase  in  this  
proportion.  Similarly,  while  recent  immigrants  and  racial  minorities  disproportionately  populate  the  
least  secure  groups  in  all  countries,  the  increased  share  of  immigrants  in  the  population  is  smaller  than  
the  increase  in  the  struggling  millennial  population.  Indeed,  the  gap  between  immigrants  and  minorities  
versus  natives  actually  shrank  in  several  key  areas  like  income,  homeownership  rates  and  political  
participation  over  the  last  forty  years.  Finally,  state  policy  in  many  places  explicitly,  if  not  always  
successfully,  aimed  at  getting  more  racial  minorities  and  recent  immigrants  into  housing,  as  with  
Clinton-­‐  and  Bush-­‐era  housing  policies.    
Below,  section  one  discusses  the  counter-­‐intuitive  emergence  of  re-­‐familialization.  Section  two  
discusses  how  income  inequality  interacted  with  housing  finance  systems  to  produce  intra-­‐cohort  
heterogeneity.  Sections  three  and  four  produce  analytic  typologies  for  understanding  this  intra-­‐cohort  
heterogeneity  and  differences  in  re-­‐familialization  respectively  for  the  younger  and  older  cohorts.  
Section  five  discusses  the  feedback  loops  and  co-­‐constitutive  processes  generating  heterogeneity.  
Section  six  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  the  major  human  and  policy  implications  of  re-­‐familialization.  
Re-­‐familialization  is  clearly  a  Polanyian  response  to  the  increasing  pressure  of  market  generated  risks  
that  are  no  longer  buffered  by  the  modern  welfare  state.  This  private  response  is  paralleled  by  an  
electoral  response  that  has  taken  the  form  of  a  realignment  of  voting  patterns  as  well  as  voters  opting  to  
support  anti-­‐system  and  anti-­‐establishment  parties  and  policy  proposals,  such  as  Brexit.  We  speculate  
that  younger  cohorts’  shrinking  ability  to  successfully  launch  has  motivated  at  least  some  parents,  and  
particularly  those  who  themselves  anticipate  exiting  into  a  more  straitened  retirement,  to  vote  against  
the  status  quo.  
  
1:  De-­‐familialization  or  re-­‐familialization?  
Has  rising  income  inequality  reversed  the  trend  towards  de-­‐familialization?  Two  decades  ago,  feminist  
scholarship  argued  that  the  welfare  state  could  not  be  understood  in  isolation  from  the  market  or  from  
the  family,  asking  how  the  welfare  state  shaped  women’s  ability  to  form  independent  households.5  This  
paralleled  other  analyses  showing  how  states  shaped  markets  in  ways  that  promoted  or  diminished  life  
and  economic  risks.6  These  analyses  dismissed  narrow  understandings  of  the  welfare  state  that  looked  
only  at  tax-­‐financed,  state  organized  transfers  and  services.  Instead  they  focused  on  how  political  
struggles  and  state  policy  produced  broad  social  systems  distributing  the  task  of  ameliorating  life  and  
market  risks  across  state,  market,  and  family.  Although  more  recent  analyses  do  incorporate  markets  
and  families  in  their  understanding  of  the  provision  of  risk  reduction,  nearly  all  analyses  retain  the  
original  framework  put  forward  by  Gösta  Esping-­‐Andersen.7  This  framework  had  a  strong  implicit  
normative  bias  idealizing  the  apparently  decommodifying  and  low-­‐stratification  nordic-­‐style  welfare  
states.    
                                               
5  O'Connor,  Orloff,  and  Shaver,  States,  Markets,  Families.  
6  Christopher  Howard,  The  Hidden  Welfare  State:  Tax  Expenditures  and  Social  Policy  in  the  United  States.  
(Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton  University  Press,  1999).  
7  John  Myles  and  Jill  Quadagno,  “Political  Theories  of  the  Welfare  State,”  Social  Service  Review  76,  no.  1  (2002):  34-­‐
57.  Gøsta  Esping-­‐Andersen,  The  Three  Worlds  of  Welfare  Capitalism  (Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton  University  Press  
1990).  Gøsta  Esping-­‐Andersen,  with  Duncan  Gallie,  Anton  Hemerijck,  and  John  Myles,  Why  We  Need  a  New  
Welfare  State  (New  York,  NY:  Oxford  University  Press  2002).  
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Part  of  this  implicit  bias  is  an  almost  teleological  assumption  that  capitalist  markets  and  states  
drive  two  interrelated  processes  of  de-­‐familialization.  The  first,  market-­‐led  process  is  the  continuous  
erosion  of  families  and  other  large-­‐scale  social  structures.  In  traditional  communities,  risks  are  pooled  
inside  families  and  small  religious  or  geographically  based  communities.8  Social  ties  and  social  coercion  
mitigate  but  do  not  eliminate  the  collective  action  problem  in  these  traditional  societies.  But  money  and  
markets  liberate  people  from  traditional  social  structures  and  practices.  While  this  freedom  in  turn  
produces  new  identities  around  consumption  or  life-­‐style  patterns,  those  identities,  communities,  and  
groups  are  inherently  less  solidaristic  than  traditional  ones.  Capitalist  markets  also  produce  an  ever-­‐finer  
division  of  labor,  which  also  breaks  down  communities  based  on  producer,  rather  than  consumption  or  
life-­‐style  identities.  Almost  by  definition,  these  newly  liberated  individuals  find  it  difficult  to  manage  risk  
on  their  own,  in  so  far  as  the  entire  principle  of  insurance  is  based  on  the  idea  of  pooled  risk.  
The  second,  state-­‐led  process  emerges  from  efforts  to  recreate  a  broader  risk  pool.  If  modernity  
erodes  families,  religious  affiliation,  and  geographical  fixity,  and  if  capitalism  breaks  up  tight-­‐knit  
producer  communities,  then  only  political  authority  can  compel  or  organize  participation  from  
individuals  who  might  otherwise  free  ride  or  prove  unable  to  overcome  the  start-­‐up  costs  for  a  broader  
insurance  pool.  Thus,  as  traditional  family  structures  dissolved  into  divorce,  blended  families,  and  single  
parent  (which  almost  always  meant:  single  mother)  households,  the  pressure  for  more  state  
intervention  surely  would  direct  more  and  more  states  into  an  ‘anglo-­‐nordic’  format:    highly  
individualized  households  relying  on  extensive  state  support  to  reproduce  themselves  and  cope  with  
various  risks.  Chiara  Saraceno  and  Wolfgang  Streeck,  among  others,  predicted  that  these  new,  expanded  
risks  arising  from  de-­‐familialization  would  induce  states  to  expand  welfare  provision  to  cushion  
individuals,  producing  a  ‘northern’  rather  than  ‘southern’  European  family  structure.9  The  welfare  state  
literature  thus  contained  an  implicit  teleological  orientation  imagining  an  ineluctable  shift  in  the  
direction  of  state-­‐driven,  rather  than  market-­‐driven,  individuation,  de-­‐familialization  and  
‘northernization’  in  pursuit  of  social  protection.  
But  increased  income  equality,  economic  insecurity,  and  in  particular  declining  access  to  housing  
did  not  produce  successful  demands  for  additional  state-­‐organized  social  welfare.  Instead,  inequality  
driven  insecurity  has  produced  increased  reliance  on  the  family.  Put  simply,  rather  than  the  south  and  
east  becoming  more  like  the  north,  northern  European  (and  North  American)  countries  are  now  
becoming  more  southern  in  terms  of  re-­‐familialization  and  housing  patterns.  Rather  than  moving  
towards  the  greater  market  orientation  and  mortgage  depth  that  used  to  characterize  the  anglo-­‐nordic  
systems,  housing  tenure  and  finance  is  moving  towards  a  more  ‘southern’  system.  There,  families  
acquire  housing  to  protect  their  children’s  future  access  to  housing  and  other  life-­‐chances,  and  younger  
cohorts  dwell  longer  in  the  parental  household.10    
Spain  provides  a  significant  example  of  these  processes.  Financial  market  liberalization  and  
regulatory  changes  in  the  1990s  and  2000s  opened  the  door  to  an  American-­‐style  housing  boom  
consistent  with  increased  de-­‐familialization.  But  the  2010  bust  forced  young  people  back  into  their  
parents’  houses.  The  share  of  18  to  34  year  olds  living  with  parents  increased  by  5  percentage  points  in  
France,  6.5  in  Germany,  11  in  Britain,  14.5  in  Spain,  and  an  astounding  20  percentage  points  in  
                                               
8  Harold  L.  Wilensky  and  Charles  N.  Lebeaux,  Industrial  Society  and  Social  Welfare  (New  York,  NY:  Free  Press,  1966);  
Abram  de  Swaan,  In  Care  of  the  State:  Health  Care,  Education,  and  Welfare  in  Europe  and  the  USA  in  the  Modern  
Era  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1988).  
9  Chiara  Saraceno,  “Family  Change,  Family  Policies  and  the  Restructuring  of  Welfare”;  Wolfgang  Streeck,  “Flexible  
Employment,  Flexible  Families,  and  the  Socialization  of  Reproduction”;  Esping-­‐Andersen  et  al.,  Why  We  Need  a  
New  Welfare  State.  
10  Judith  Allen,  James  Barlow,  Jesús  Leal,  Thomas  Maloutas,  and  Liliana  Padovani,  Housing  and  Welfare  in  Southern  
Europe  (New  York:  Oxford  University,  2004).  
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economically  troubled  Italy  from  2007  to  2011.  By  2011,  48  percent  of  EU28  18  to  34  year  olds  lived  with  
their  parents,  versus  30.5  percent  in  the  somewhat  smaller  EU25  in  2003.11  Precisely  this  phenomenon,  
and  more  generally  reduced  economic  prospects,  generated  the  ‘Aún  no  tenemos  casa’  chants  at  
Spanish  political  rallies  over  the  last  near  decade.  Similarly,  after  2007,  the  share  of  American  18  to  34  
year  olds  living  with  their  parents  rose  by  four  percentage  points  to  an  all-­‐time  high  of  36  percent.12  
Three  main  indicators  of  youth  well-­‐being  –  failure  to  launch,  income,  and  the  NEET  (Not  in  Education,  
Employment  or  Training)  rate  for  the  current  25  to  34-­‐year  old  cohort  –  are  all  worse  relative  to  the  
equivalent  cohort  three  decades  ago.13  What  explains  this  sharp  reversal  of  de-­‐familialization  at  its  most  
basic  level,  namely,  reversal  of  the  former  trend  towards  nuclear  families  as  young  people  exited  the  
parental  household?  
Much  of  the  action  here  involves  housing.  The  availability  and  affordability  of  housing  is  
probably  the  single  most  important  factor  in  household  formation.  Put  simply,  rising  housing  and  rent  
costs  combined  with  a  split-­‐level  labor  market  (one  face  of  rising  income  inequality)  to  hinder  
millennials’  entry  into  independent  living.  After  peaking  at  50  percent  in  2004,  the  ownership  rate  for  US  
25  to  34  year  olds  fell  to  39  percent  by  2016.  Rental  costs  have  also  risen  by  5  percentage  points  of  
income  for  US  25  to  34  year  olds,  and  by  8  percentage  points  of  income  for  18  to  24  year  olds,  even  as  
disposable  income  has  fallen  by  about  10  percent.14  The  same  trends  in  Britain  and  Australia  put  the  
phrase  ‘Generation  Rent’  into  common  parlance  since  at  least  2004.15  Rising  income  inequality  and  
financial  deregulation  combined  to  produce  rapidly  rising  housing  prices  in  most  rich  countries  in  the  
2000s.  Despite  differences  in  the  specific  mechanism,  the  general  dynamic  arose  from  a  higher  marginal  
propensity  to  save  on  the  part  of  higher  income  groups.  How  did  this  affect  access  to  housing  and  stable  
pensions  for  different  cohorts?  
The  usual  arguments  pose  this  as  an  intergenerational  conflict  between  younger  and  older  
cohorts  over  pension  funding.16  But  this  generational  frame  conceals  heterogeneity  in  life  chances  
within  both  the  older  and  younger  cohorts.  Heterogeneity  in  access  to  parental  and  own  resources  
produces  heterogeneity  in  the  ability  to  exit  within  the  millennial  cohort.  Rising  income  inequality  will  
only  increase  this  heterogeneity.  We  can  categorize  eight  ideal  types  within  this  cohort  based  on  three  
variables:  job  quality  in  terms  of  wage  level  and  stability;  the  quality  and  quantity  of  parental  support  
they  received  in  attaining  that  housing;  and  whether  or  not  they  have  obtained  housing  outside  the  
parental  home.  The  first  issue  is  whether  young  couples  have  enough  income  to  launch  themselves,  or  
whether  they  boomerang  back  to  the  parental  home.  The  second  issue  is  whether  parents  are  able  to  
help  capitalize  younger  cohorts  or  whether  that  cohort  has  to  pool  resources  with  parents  to  sustain  the  
larger  family’s  standard  of  living.  The  third  issue  is  simply  the  outcome  with  respect  to  moving  out:  do  
younger  cohorts  form  independent  households?  Section  three  characterizes  each  group.  
The  near-­‐retirement  cohort  looks  homogeneous  because  in  the  aggregate  it  holds  considerable  
home  equity  and  bears  relatively  low  levels  of  debt.  But  varying  levels  of  mortgage  liability  and  real  
estate  assets  produce  heterogeneity  in  the  near-­‐retirement  cohort  as  well.  Here  too,  income  inequality  
                                               
11Robert  Anderson  and  Hans  Dubois,  “3rd  European  Quality  of  Life  Survey:  Quality  of  Life  in  Europe:  Impacts  of  the  
Crisis,”  (Luxembourg:  Publications  Office  of  the  European  Union,  2012).    
12  Pew  Research  Center,  “A  Rising  Share  of  Young  Adults  Live  in  Their  Parents’  Home,”  (August  2013);  online  at:  
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/07/SDT-­‐millennials-­‐living-­‐with-­‐parents-­‐07-­‐2013.pdf    
13  Louis  Chauvel  and  Martin  Schröder,  “Generational  Inequalities  and  Welfare  Regimes,”  Social  Forces  92,  no.  4  
(2014):  1259-­‐1283.  
14    Demos,  “The  State  of  Young  America:  Economic  Barriers  to  the  American  Dream,”  (November  2011);  online  at:  
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/SOYA_TheDatabook_2.pdf    
15  A  Lexis-­‐Nexis  Academic  search  done  on  30  June  2017  on  newspaper  entries  for  the  phrase  “generation  rent”  
turns  up  nearly  1000  entries  that  begin  in  2004  and  accelerate  from  2011  forward.  
16  Laurence  Kotlikoff  and  Scott  Burns,  The  Coming  Generational  Storm  (Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press,  2005).  
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segments  this  cohort’s  ability  to  acquire  investment  property  and  thus  secure  a  more  robust  retirement  
income.  As  with  the  millennial  cohort,  aggregation  conceals  four  different  ideal  types  that  reflect  the  
degree  to  which  housing  can  serve  as  an  income  stream  or  simply  as  imputed  rent,  or  neither  for  a  given  
household.  Two  factors  define  these  four  types.  The  first  factor  is  the  scale  of  mortgage  debt  as  a  
household  ages  into  retirement.  The  second  factor  is  the  market  value  of  their  house.  These  define  the  
ability  to  use  home  equity  or  other  real  estate  assets  as  a  substitute  for  increasingly  fragile  pensions.  
Section  four  lays  out  these  types.  
The  differing  sub-­‐cohort  trajectories  create  feedback  loops  at  the  level  of  the  household  and  the  
market,  as  well  as  one  co-­‐constitutive  relationship  at  the  level  of  the  market.  Both  sets  of  relationships  
manifest  themselves  in  re-­‐familialization.  At  the  household  level,  re-­‐familialization  can  occur  at  both  
ends  of  the  age  distribution,  as  income  constrained  children  remain  in  or  return  to  the  parental  home,  
and  as  aging  and  income  constrained  parents  either  cohabit  with  children  or  rely  on  children’s  income.  
This  income  pooling  sustains  a  given  standard  of  living  for  both  groups.  At  the  market  level,  older  
cohorts’  strategies  around  housing  also  create  feedback  loops.  Older  households,  who  can  only  enjoy  
imputed  rent  from  their  house,  lock  up  larger  housing  units  that  younger  cohorts  might  desire  for  family  
formation.  Younger  cohorts  living  at  home  lower  demand  for  housing  and  provide  fewer  chances  for  
older  cohorts  to  cash  out  their  home  equity.  Both  behaviors  remove  liquidity  from  the  housing  market.  
When  parts  of  older  cohorts  become  landlords  by  buying  extra  houses  to  supplement  their  pensions,  
they  necessarily  constitute  a  parallel  group  of  younger  renters.  Finally,  housing  wealth  that  traditionally  
was  handed  down  as  an  inheritance  is  now  being  used  by  families  at  the  upper  end  of  the  income  
distribution  to  help  launch  their  children.  This  accelerates  the  reproduction  of  inequality  as  children  in  
better  resourced  families  receive  housing  wealth  earlier  in  life.  
  
2:  Causal  Drivers:    Inequality  and  housing  finance  
Rising  income  inequality  has  reversed  the  trend  towards  the  state  supported  de-­‐familialization  that  
characterized  the  post-­‐war  era  and  that  the  literature  projected  into  the  future.  Income  inequality  on  its  
own  is  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  explaining  the  increasing  heterogeneity  and  re-­‐
familialization  in  the  millennial  and  near-­‐retirement  cohorts.  Parallel  changes  in  housing  finance  also  
drive  re-­‐familialization.  Housing  finance  systems  have  translated  and  amplified  the  effects  of  rising  
income  inequality  in  ways  that  fragmented  both  groups.  Put  too  simply,  from  the  1950s  through  1970s  
housing  finance  for  owner-­‐occupation  and  rental  construction  tended  to  deliver  a  standard  loan  at  a  
subsidized  interest  rate  to  the  ethno-­‐national  core  of  the  adult  population.17  This  homogenized  housing  
units,  redefined  the  social  understanding  of  a  family  unit  towards  nuclear  families  and  single  person  
households,  and  enabled  de-­‐familialization  by  simultaneously  tightening  labor  markets  and  rapidly  
expanding  the  housing  stock.18  By  the  1990s  and  2000s,  the  housing  finance  system  was  fractionating  
potential  buyers  and  builders  based  on  their  income  and  credit  rating,  delivering  finely  calibrated  loans  
with  borrower  specific  interest  rates.  This  magnified  the  effects  of  rising  wage  and  wealth  inequality  by  
increasing  the  barriers  to  exit  for  millennials  with  increasingly  weaker  incomes  and  work  histories.  
Fractionation  blocked  part  of  that  cohort  from  exiting  the  parental  home,  producing  heterogeneity.  Just  
as  insider-­‐outsider  dynamics  increasingly  characterized  labor  markets,  insider-­‐outsider  dynamics  
increasingly  characterized  younger  cohorts’  ability  to  exit.  Simultaneously,  differential  access  to  parental  
wealth  and  thus  housing  down  payments  created  differences  in  millennials’  long-­‐term  ability  to  
accumulate  housing  wealth.  
                                               
17  Mark  Boleat,  National  Housing  Finance  Systems  (London:  Croom  Helm,  1985).  
18  Hayden,  Redesigning  the  American  Dream;  Herbert  Gans,  The  Levittowners  (New  York,  NY:  Columbia  University  
Press,  1982);  Andrew  Hacker,  The  End  of  the  American  Era  (New  York,  NY:  Sidgwick  &  Jackson,  1970).  
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In  parallel,  as  the  first  wave  of  baby  boomers  aged  out,  access  to  secure  pensions  weakened.19  
This  cohort  experienced  income  inequality  as  increasingly  insecure  employment  in  their  50s.  Here,  too,  
differences  in  employment  security  combined  with  the  shift  in  housing  finance  to  produce  
heterogeneity.  This  cohort  had  enjoyed  some  of  the  homogenizing  benefits  of  the  old  housing  finance  
systems.  Unlike  millennials,  in  most  countries  this  cohort  benefited  from  rising  nominal  housing  prices.  
Part  of  the  flow  of  extra  savings  accruing  to  top  income  groups  shifted  from  low  yielding  bonds  into  
housing.  At  the  same  time,  other,  lower  income  near-­‐pensioners  began  borrowing  against  home  equity  
in  an  effort  to  shore  up  their  lifestyle  in  the  face  of  wage  stagnation.20  In  a  co-­‐constitutive  process,  
millennials’  weak  ability  to  buy  housing  sapped  the  pension  replacement  potential  of  real  estate  by  
removing  liquidity  from  the  housing  market.21  
Housing  and  housing  finance  thus  allow  us  to  understand  how  each  cohort  experienced  rising  
income  inequality  and  how  that  inequality  translates  into  re-­‐familialization  and  intra-­‐cohort  tensions.  
Housing  as  a  sector  and  homeownership  as  a  social  relation  were  as  central  to  economic  growth  as  
fordism’s  iconic  automobile  industry  before  the  1980s,  and  as  important  as  digitalization  in  the  decades  
after.  Perhaps  even  more  so.  Former  FED  Governor  Edward  Leamer  has  argued  that  not  only  was  
housing  central  to  the  post-­‐war  business  cycle  in  the  United  States,  the  archetypical  fordist  economy,  
but  also  that  housing  was  the  post-­‐war  business  cycle,  driving  everything  else.22  The  United  States  is  not  
unique  with  respect  to  the  economic  centrality  of  housing.  Housing  construction  historically  accounted  
for  about  4  percent  of  GDP  in  the  rich  OECD  countries,  or  about  20  to  25  percent  of  gross  investment,  a  
share  larger  than  the  automobile  industry  at  its  peak.23  Housing  construction  strongly  affected  labor  
markets  and  incomes.  Consistent  and  continuous  housing  production  helped  tighten  male  labor  
markets,  push  up  wages,  and  absorb  immigrant  labor.  This  enabled  earlier  family  formation  for  new  
labor  market  entrants  before  the  1980s,  unlike  the  somewhat  lower  and  more  erratic  volumes  of  
construction  after  1980.24        
Given  its  economic  and  political  centrality,  state  policy  everywhere  targeted  housing.  Although  
the  specific  modalities  differed,  every  OECD  state  promoted  more  and  better  housing  in  the  post-­‐war  
period.25  The  US  government,  for  example,  undertook  a  massive  intervention  in  credit  markets  by  
providing  mortgage  insurance  through  the  Federal  Housing  Administration  (FHA)  and  other  federal  HAs,  
as  well  as  through  the  giant  government  sponsored  enterprises  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac.  This  
stabilized  the  validity  of  the  savings  and  loan  sector’s  (i.e.  ‘bausparkassen’  or  ‘cooperative’  banks)  major  
asset,  namely  mortgages;  deposit  insurance  similarly  stabilized  their  major  liability.26  At  the  other  end  of  
                                               
19  Mitchell  Orenstein,  Privatizing  Pensions:  The  Transnational  Campaign  for  Social  Security  Reform  (Princeton:  
Princeton  University  Press,  2008).    
20  Elizabeth  Warren  and  Andrea  Tyagi,  The  Two-­‐Income  Trap  (New  York,  NY:  Basic  Books,  2007).  Federal  Reserve  
Bank,  Flow  of  Funds,  release  Z1  (Washington  DC:  Federal  Reserve  Bank  2016).  
21  Neda  Delfani,  Johan  De  Deken,  and  Caroline  Dewilde,  “Home-­‐ownership  and  Pensions:  Negative  Correlation,  but  
No  Trade-­‐off,”  Housing  Studies  29,  no.  5  (2014):  657-­‐676.  
22  Edward  Leamer,  “Housing  is  the  Business  Cycle,”  NBER  working  paper  No.  w13428  (Chicago:  National  Bureau  of  
Economic  Research,  August  2007).  See  also  Matteo  Iacoviello,  “Housing  in  DSGE  Models:  Findings  and  New  
Directions,”  Housing  Markets  in  Europe,  Oliver  de  Bandt,  Thomas  Knetsch,  Juan  Peñalosa,  &  Francesco  Zollino,  eds.  
(Berlin:  Springer  Science  &  Business  Media  2010);  and  Colin  Crouch,  “Privatised  Keynesianism:  An  Unacknowledged  
Policy  Regime,”  The  British  Journal  of  Politics  &  International  Relations  11,  no.  3  (2009):  382-­‐399.  
23  Data  accessed  from  OECD  online  database;  online  at  http://www.OECD-­‐iLibrary.org.  
24  Boleat,  National  Housing  Finance  Systems.  
25  Herman  Mark  Schwartz  and  Leonard  Seabrooke,  “Varieties  of  Residential  Capitalism  in  the  International  Political  
Economy:  Old  Welfare  States  and  the  New  Politics  of  Housing,”  Comparative  European  Politics  6,  no.  3  (2008):  237-­‐
261.  
26  Herman  Mark  Schwartz,  “Housing,  the  Welfare  State,  and  the  Global  Financial  Crisis:    What  is  the  Connection?”  
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the  welfare  state  spectrum,  the  Swedish  government  undertook  a  massive  home  construction  and  
upgrading  project,  the  ‘one  million  home’  project,  in  the  1960s.  Scale  this  effort  against  Sweden’s  
population  of  roughly  8  million  in  1970.  In  between  lie  France’s  banlieu  of  Habitation  à  loyer  Modéré,  
Britain’s  council  housing,  and  more  variegated  German  projects  like  Berlin’s  Märkisches  Viertel.  
This  state  policy  helped  create  a  huge  pool  of  assets  (and  thus  liabilities)  that  showed  up  on  
household  balance  sheets,  and  directly  affected  the  ability  of  older  cohorts  to  exit  into  retirement  
without  financial  stress.  As  an  asset  class,  housing  is  often  the  single  largest  private  (i.e.  non-­‐state)  asset  
in  most  countries.27  Even  in  the  US,  which  has  an  enormous  equity  market  relative  to  its  economy,  and  
one  that  proportionately  is  twice  as  large  in  relation  to  GDP  as  that  of  the  Eurozone,  mortgages  
constituted  roughly  70  percent  of  the  total  US  private  debt  stock  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  with  the  
savings  and  loan  sector  holding  between  a  third  and  half  of  this  debt.28  In  2015  the  equity  value  of  US  
residential  housing  approximated  stock  market  capitalization  that  year,  and  the  total  value  of  residential  
housing  (mortgages  plus  equity)  exceeded  either  of  stock  market  equity  or  total  Federal  public  debt  by  a  
considerable  margin.29  For  those  at  the  top  of  the  income  pyramid,  the  housing  market  was  a  channel  to  
transform  their  extra  income  into  an  asset  (particularly  after  rates  of  return  for  cash  essentially  turned  
negative  in  the  late  2000s).    
State  policy  combined  with  social  desires  to  drive  homeownership  rates  up  across  the  rich  
OECD.  Roughly  speaking,  almost  all  rich  OECD  societies  shifted  from  a  1/3  –  2/3  society  in  which  most  
people  rented,  to  a  2/3  –  1/3  society  in  which  most  people  owned  their  dwelling.  The  timing  on  this  
differed.  The  United  States  led,  with  owner  occupation  roughly  doubling  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  
Societies  with  robust  more  social  housing  programs  experienced  this  transition  later.  Table  1  shows  the  
increase  in  ownership  in  western  Europe  from  the  mid-­‐1990s,  when  financial  deregulation  combined  
with  partial  privatization  of  social  and  cooperative  housing  to  produce  one  last  jump  in  ownership.    
Again,  state  policy  helped  increase  the  number  of  affordable  housing  units,  accommodating  
rising  de-­‐familialization  in  a  physical  sense  as  each  rich  OECD  country  experienced  a  post-­‐war  marriage  
and  baby  boom.  Easy  access  to  housing  should  not  be  exaggerated,  however,  as  immigrant  populations  
(including  internal  migrants,  like  northbound  African-­‐Americans  in  the  United  States  or  southern  Italians  
to  the  industrial  north)  often  ended  up  in  slums  or  shanty  towns.30  The  homogenization  described  above  
thus  was  largely  limited  to  an  ethno-­‐national  core  with  privileged  access  to  mortgage  finance.    
In  the  past  two  decades,  however,  these  two  trends  have  reversed.  Rising  income  inequality  and  
financial  deregulation  produced  rapidly  rising  real  and  nominal  housing  prices  in  the  2000s.  Despite  the  
2008-­‐2010  crisis,  housing  prices  remain  elevated  almost  everywhere.  Real  home  prices  more  than  
doubled  in  Britain,  Australia,  Sweden,  Norway  and  Canada  from  1998  to  2014.  US  housing  prices  
regained  almost  all  of  the  ground  lost  in  the  crash  by  mid-­‐2016.  Only  Japanese  housing  prices  have  
receded  substantially  in  real  terms.31  These  trends  produced  the  re-­‐familialization  and  heterogeneity  





                                                                                                                                                       
Politics  &  Society  40,  no.  1  (2012):  35-­‐58.  
27  Thomas  Piketty,  Capital  in  the  21st  Century  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  2014).  
28  Federal  Reserve  Bank,  Flow  of  Funds,  release  Z1  (Washington  DC:  Federal  Reserve  Bank  1973).  
29  Federal  Reserve  Bank,  Flow  of  Funds,  release  Z1  (2016).  
30  See,  e.g.  Rothstein,  Color  of  Law.  
31  OECD  (Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development),  Global  Economic  Outlook  #97,  June  2015  
(Paris:  OECD,  2015).  




Table  1:  Level  of  and  change  in  homeownership  rates  in  the  US  and  Europe,  percent,  1981-­‐2013  
   1981*   1996   2003      delta  1981-­‐2003,  percentage  points   2013**  
   delta  2003-­‐2013,  
percentage  points  
Belgium   61   65   72.9      11.9   72.0      -­‐  0.9  
Denmark   52   50   65.0      13.0   63.0      -­‐  2.0  
France   47   54   62.7      15.7   64.3      1.6  
Italy   59   67   75.5      16.5   73.2      -­‐  2.3  
Spain   64   76   85.3      21.3   78.8      -­‐  6.5  
Sweden   n/a   43   59.9      (16.9)   69.6        9.7  
UK   59   67   70.6      11.6   64.6      -­‐  6.0  
USA   65.2   65.4   68.6      3.6   65.2      -­‐  3.4  
Source:  Boleat,  National  Housing  Finance  Systems;  EMF  (European  Mortgage  Foundation),  Hypostat    (Brussels:    
European  Mortgage  Foundation,  various  years).  
*  =  1981  or  nearest  year,  usually  1979-­‐1981;  **  =  2013  or  2014  
  
3:  Younger  cohorts  disaggregated  
Income  inequality  mediated  through  housing  and  housing  financial  institutions  produces  varying  
degrees  of  re-­‐familialization,  i.e.  an  increased  reliance  on  parental  social  and  financial  resources,  in  the  
millennial  cohort.  Two  things  drive  independent  household  formation:  young  adults’  desire  to  exit  and  
the  resources  to  realize  that  desire.  With  respect  to  desire,  nearly  all  young  adults  seek  to  live  
independently,  albeit  with  some  culturally  driven  variation.  With  respect  to  resources,  young  adults’  job  
situation  obviously  matters,  so  inequality  in  their  income  affects  exit.  For  example,  in  2011,  only  one-­‐
third  of  employed  18  to  29  year  olds  in  the  EU  lived  with  their  parents,  as  compared  to  two-­‐thirds  of  the  
unemployed.32  But  parental  resources  to  supplement  young  adults’  wages  or  help  provide  a  down  
payment  also  vary.  These  jointly  determine  the  total  volume  of  resources  available  for  exit.  Parental  
resources  provide  the  link  to  older  cohorts’  pension  situation,  so  the  discussion  below  foregrounds  that.  
Re-­‐familialization  can  occur  through  co-­‐location  or  transfers  of  money,  thus  creating  different  pathways  
and  obstacles  to  the  ability  to  attain  typical  life-­‐cycle  milestones  like  independent  living,  home  
ownership,  and  entry  into  parenthood.  Combining  these  three  variables  –  success  in  exiting,  the  level  of  
parental  resources,  and  own  resources  –  produces  eight  ideal  types  with  varying  degrees  of  re-­‐
familialization.33  This  typology  blends  both  causes  and  outcomes  to  identify  different  kinds  of  re-­‐
familialization.  It  allows  us  to  move  beyond  generic  labels  like  ‘Generation  Rent’  and  ‘Generation  
Landlord’  that  obscure  the  more  variegated  sets  of  social  circumstances  facing  younger  and  older  
cohorts.    
Figure  1  compresses  this  three-­‐dimensional  array  of  social  situations  into  a  two  by  two  chart  to  
highlight  the  kind  of  re-­‐familialization  produces  by  variation  in  exit  and  level  of  parental  support.  Using  
                                               
32  Eurofound,  Social  Situation  of  Young  People  in  Europe  (Luxembourg:  Publications  Office  of  the  European  Union,  
2014).    
33  A  visualization  is  available  at  http://www.people.virginia.edu/~hms2f/PAS-­‐figureA.pdf  or  
http://lindsayflynn.net/PAS-­‐figureA.pdf.  
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only  own  income  conceals  one  type  of  re-­‐familialization  by  aggregating  groups  that  have  already  exited  
the  parental  home  with  those  who  have  not.  Each  box  contains  groups  that  differ  on  the  dimension  of  
their  quality  of  employment,  with  higher  income  earners  as  the  first  line  and  lower  income  earners  as  
the  second,  and  with  the  source  of  financial  support  in  italics.  We  provide  provisional  descriptive  
statistics  confirming  our  intuitions  about  these  groups  at  the  end  of  this  section.  
  
  
Figure  1:  Ability  to  realize  desired  milestones  mediated  by  housing  access  
      Living  Arrangements  












Difficulty  realizing  desired  
milestones;  some  ability  to  catch  







Difficulty  realizing  desired  
milestones  because  of  expensive  
housing  relative  to  income  
  




Difficulty  realizing  desired  
milestones;  difficulty  catching  up  
as  saving  is  slower  
  
Income  pooling  across  generations  
  
Three  situations  in  Figure  1,  namely  1,  2,  and  4,  involve  some  degree  of  re-­‐familialization,  
captured  in  the  italicized  sources  of  extra  resources.  Going  clockwise,  in  quadrant  1,  Launchers  combine  
robust  employment  related  resources  and  access  to  parental  social  and  financial  resources.  This  helps  
them  overcome  the  barrier  created  by  rising  house  prices,  and  in  particular  the  problem  of  acquiring  a  
down  payment  or  a  rental  security  deposit.  Parents’  social  and  cultural  resources  provide  entrée  to  
desirable  jobs  with  stable  incomes,  and  also  the  financial  literacy  to  navigate  a  difficult  housing  market.  
This  group  attains  life-­‐cycle  milestones  more  easily,  and  often  on  their  preferred  timetable.  While  that  
timetable  is  delayed  relative  to  the  baby  boomer  generation  because  of  changing  social  and  educational  
norms,  the  people  falling  into  this  quadrant  have  the  least  stressful  path  to  those  outcomes.  This  
quadrant  also  contains  a  much  smaller  group  of  people,  pejoratively  labeled  Trustafarians  in  the  United  
States,  who  either  have  no  job  or  badly  paid  but  creative  jobs,  and  who  are  living  independently  using  
trust  funds  supplied  by  their  parents.  
In  quadrant  2,  the  Cautious  Savers  and  Interns  groups  have  access  to  parental  social  and  
financial  resources  but  still  remain  in  the  parental  home.  The  latter  lack  their  own  resources  while  the  
former  have  a  good  job  but  desire  to  save  up  in  anticipation  of  a  later  launch  window.  Cautious  Savers  
have  good  jobs,  but  remain  in  the  parental  home  in  order  to  accumulate  substantial  savings  for  housing.  
Parental  resources  help  this  type  to  avoid  accumulating  debt,  enabling  them  to  catch  up  in  terms  of  
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milestones  later.  In  particular,  fertility  here  is  ‘postponed  but  not  foregone.’34  In  the  ideal  typical  Interns  
case,  parental  resources  provide  access  to  and  the  financial  cushion  to  take  on  prized  but  unpaid  
internships.  Less  ideally,  this  group  may  be  in  poorly  paid  work  that  potentially  tracks  into  higher  quality  
jobs,  like  entry  level  jobs  for  non-­‐degreed,  non-­‐credentialed  positions  in  the  professions,  or  in  menial  
employment  while  they  pursue  artistic  ambitions.35  Because  the  filtering  process  for  these  professional  
tracks  is  quite  strict,  many  of  them  will  ultimately  fail  to  launch.  This  is  not  a  uniquely  American  
phenomenon.  Between  5  and  10  percent  of  entering  French  cohorts  –  roughly  1.2  million  people  –  are  
hired  annually  as  stagiaires  (interns),  of  whom  about  one-­‐third  are  over  the  age  of  35.36  In  Germany,  
roughly  40  percent  of  each  cohort  starts  out  in  internships  or  apprenticeships.37  Finally,  this  quadrant  
also  contains  less  ambitious  individuals  that  are  socially  significant  in  Japan,  pejoratively  called  parasite  
singles  and  Freeters.  The  Italian  equivalent  is  the  much  larger  group  of  ‘mammoni,’  adult  males  living  
with  their  mothers.  Almost  70  percent  of  Italian  men  aged  27-­‐30  live  with  their  parents.38    
Quadrant  4,  in  the  southeast,  contains  two  groups  facing  the  greatest  difficulties.  Lacking  their  
own  resources  and  robust  parental  resources,  they  can  neither  form  nor  maintain  independent  
households.  In  either  case,  nuclear  families  persist  or  re-­‐form  in  order  to  pool  resources.  The  largest  
sub-­‐group  in  this  quadrant  is  the  Marginalized,  whose  poor  employment  situation  throws  them  back  on  
parents’  resources.  This  reliance  on  limited  parental  resources  strains  parents’  ability  to  accumulate  
sufficient  pension  savings.  At  the  other  end  is  a  much  smaller  group  of  Pooled  Households  in  which  
income-­‐poor  parents  rely  on  their  children’s  resources.  Unlike  Cautious  Savers,  whose  access  to  parental  
resources  allows  them  to  accumulate  from  their  adequate  wages,  this  group  consumes  its  potential  
savings  supporting  the  pooled  household.  The  degree  of  stress  can  be  seen  in  the  fact  that  in  the  United  
States  only  35  rental  units  exist  for  every  100  households  considered  to  be  extremely  low  income.  This  
forces  these  low-­‐income  households  into  housing  that  is  unaffordable,  such  that  over  70%  of  them  
spend  more  than  half  of  their  income  on  rent  and  utilities.39  
Southern  Europe’s  weak  youth  labor  markets  and  poor  pensions  for  elderly  non-­‐formal  workers  
make  this  familial  resource  pooling  a  necessity.40  Racial  minorities  and  recent  immigrants  are  also  
disproportionately  found  in  this  group.  Typically,  the  only  way  for  these  groups  to  exit  the  parental  
household  is  to  take  on  considerable  debt  from  formal  or  informal  credit  markets,  or  to  become  
perpetual  renters.  Equally  so,  to  pick  one  key  milestone,  earlier  fertility  relies  on  pooled  family  labor,  as  
when  grandparents  provide  childcare  for  mothers  working  low  wage  jobs,  or  where  independent  living  
requires  remaining  in  close  proximity  to  parents  regardless  of  job  opportunities.  While  this  characterizes  
the  poor  in  many  societies,  not  just  southern  Europe,  stagnant  wages  are  pushing  more  and  more  
people  into  this  category.  Here  fertility  is  postponed  and  sometimes  foregone,  because  the  financial  
                                               
34  Francesco  Billari  and  Hans-­‐Peter  Kohler,  “Patterns  of  Low  and  Lowest-­‐Low  Fertility  in  Europe,”  Population  
Studies  58,  no.  2  (2004):  161-­‐176.  
35  Lena  Dunham’s  HBO  TV  series  Girls  provides  a  fictionalized  portrait  of  this  group.  
36  Timothy  Smith,  France  in  Crisis:  Welfare,  Inequality,  and  Globalization  since  1980  (New  York,  NY:  Cambridge  
University  Press,  2004).  
37  Dieter  Grühn  and  Heidemarie  Hecht,  Generation  Praktikum?  Prekäre  Beschäftigungsformen  von  
Hochschulabsolventinnen  und  -­‐absolventen  (Berlin:  DGB-­‐Bundesvorstand,  2007);  Kolja  Briedis  and  Karl-­‐Heinz  
Minks,  Generation  Praktikum-­‐Mythos  oder  Massenphänomen?  (HIS  Hochschul-­‐Informations-­‐System-­‐GmbH,  2007);  
online  at  http://his.de/pdf/22/generationpraktikum.pdf    
38  Maria  Iacovou,  “Leaving  Home:  Independence,  Togetherness  and  Income,”  Advances  in  Life  Course  Research  15,  
no.  4  (2010):  147-­‐160.  
39  National  Low  Income  Housing  Coalition,  “The  Gap:  A  Shortage  of  Affordable  Homes,”  (March  2017);  online  at:  
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Gap-­‐Report_2017.pdf.    
40  Allen  et  al.  Housing  and  welfare  in  Southern  Europe.  
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trade-­‐off  between  housing  and  children  is  sharpest.41  By  failing  to  get  ahead,  people  in  these  groups  fall  
behind  with  respect  to  socially  expected  life  milestones.    
Renters,  in  quadrant  3,  have  become  an  iconic  group  of  our  time  as  ‘Generation  Rent.’  Everyone  
wants  to  leave  home,  but  this  group  lacks  the  parental  resources  to  easily  access  home  ownership.  In  
the  ideal  typical  case,  young  adult  couples  here  have  better  than  average  jobs  that  nevertheless  do  not  
allow  them  to  save  fast  enough  to  accumulate  a  down  payment  for  houses  whose  prices  keep  rising.  
Unlike  the  Marginalized,  this  group  can  afford  to  exit  the  parental  home.  But  like  the  Marginalized,  they  
face  a  trade-­‐off  between  saving  for  a  down  payment  and  immediately  starting  a  family.  This  could  also  
take  the  form  of  having  children  but  in  more  cramped  housing.  Less  ideally,  at  lower  incomes  the  
Precariat  type  starts  to  shade  into  the  Marginalized  and  finds  itself  perpetually  renting  or  struggling  to  
remain  in  adequate  rental  housing.  The  absence  of  parental  resources  throws  this  group  into  formal  
credit  markets  when  they  try  to  access  homeownership.  As  with  Pooled  Households,  racial  minorities  
and  recent  immigrants  are  disproportionately  located  in  the  Precariat.  
As  with  all  typologies,  these  eight  types  conceal  more  complex  situations  combining  features  of  
several  types  as  well  as  transitions  among  types.  For  example,  someone  in  a  Renter  situation  might  
partner  up  with  someone  who  has  parental  resources  and  thus  constitute  a  new  Launcher  household.  
Likewise,  people  might  change  jobs  and  move  from  a  below  average  income  to  an  above  average  
income  (or  lose  a  good  job,  and  fall  into  one  of  the  worse-­‐off  situations).  Despite  these  complexities,  this  
static  typology  helps  us  understand  the  dynamics  driving  re-­‐familialization  by  giving  us  broad  categories  
of  social  positions  in  an  era  of  decreased  social  mobility.  Three  of  the  four  quadrants  contain  social  
groups  that  are  either  delaying  or  reversing  emancipation.  Three  of  four  quadrants  also  suggest  
increased  barriers  to  attaining  desired  life-­‐cycle  milestones.    
Can  we  empirically  confirm  these  ideal  types?  Does  the  change  over  time  match  our  prediction?  
We  determine  the  extent  to  which  young  households  map  onto  the  ideal  types  identified  above  using  
individual  and  household  level  survey  data  for  thirteen  countries  from  the  Luxembourg  Income  Study  
(LIS).42  The  data  span  three  decades,  from  approximately  1980  to  2010,  but  are  repeated  cross-­‐sectional  
data,  not  longitudinal  data.  We  use  data  for  the  25  to  34-­‐year  old  cohort  to  capture  the  young  adult  
years  after  tertiary  education.    
For  conceptual  and  practical  reasons  we  use  own  income  and  emancipation  rather  than  parental  
support  and  emancipation  (as  above  in  figure  1)  to  re-­‐group  our  eight  types  into  four  groups.  Practically,  
the  nature  of  household  survey  data  makes  it  difficult  (and  in  most  cases,  impossible)  to  ascertain  the  
level  of  parental  support  for  25  to  34-­‐year  olds  once  they  exit  the  parental  household.  Once  formerly  
dependent  children  exit  the  parental  household,  they  constitute  their  own  household.  Typically,  no  
identifier  links  the  younger  and  older  cohort  households,  and  moreover  there  is  no  guarantee  that  both  
households  are  surveyed.    We  assess  their  own  income  in  terms  of  whether  household  income  is  above  
or  below  the  average  household  income  for  the  entire  society.  Using  the  mean  rather  than  median  
income  as  the  dividing  point  captures  the  effects  of  rising  income  inequality  and  falling  access  to  ‘good  
jobs.’  We  classify  living  arrangements  based  on  whether  individuals  live  with  their  parents  or  have  
acquired  housing  independent  from  their  parents.  This  produces  four  pooled  groups:  Launchers  and  
Renters;  Cautious  Savers  and  Pooled  Households;  the  Precariat  and  Trustafarians;  and  the  Marginalized  
and  Interns.  Regrouping  puts  Launchers  and  Renters  together.  These  two  groups  should  have  the  easiest  
path  towards  reaching  key  milestones,  so  highlighting  them  shows  the  degree  to  which  everyone’s  life  
chances  have  worsened.  
                                               
41  Lindsay  Flynn,  “Delayed  and  Depressed:  From  Expensive  Housing  to  Smaller  Families,”  International  Journal  of  
Housing  Policy  (forthcoming  2017);  online  at    http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14616718.2016.1241936.  
42    LIS  Cross-­‐National  Data  Center  (n.d.)  Luxembourg  Income  Study  Database.  Luxembourg,  available  at  
http://www.lisdatacenter.org.  
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What  happened  within  and  across  these  groups?  From  roughly  1980  to  2010  –  that  is,  before  
the  full  effects  of  the  global  financial  crisis  –  the  share  of  Launchers  and  Renters  in  our  13  countries  
declined,  and  within  this  pooled  group  the  share  of  homeowners  also  declined  relative  to  societal  
averages.  Put  simply,  the  combined  share  of  these  best-­‐case  scenario  groups  in  the  younger  cohort  –  
those  living  independently  and  enjoying  above  average  wages  –  is  shrinking  essentially  everywhere,  
implying  that  more  people  are  moving  downwards  into  the  Precariat  and  other  groups.  Table  2  
compares  comprehensive  data  for  all  four  combined  pairs  of  ideal  types,  using  four  countries  
representing  the  major  welfare  state  regimes.43  The  trends  largely  conform  to  our  expectation.  The  
pooled  group  of  emancipated  youth  with  above  average  incomes  –  Launchers  plus  Renters  –  shrinks  in  
each  of  the  four  countries,  though  least  of  all  in  Norway.  On  average,  Launchers  and  Renters  combined  
represented  29.4%  of  the  25  to  34  year  old  cohort  in  1980,  but  by  2010  they  had  fallen  to  22.0%.  Those  
falling  from  this  group  go  to  the  other  more  economically  precarious  groups  in  varying  proportions,  
depending  on  the  robustness  of  economic  growth  in  their  economy,  the  degree  to  which  the  welfare  
state  cushions  new  entrants  to  the  housing  market  against  rising  home  prices  or  illiquid  housing  
markets,  and  social  norms  about  living  with  one’s  parents.  Thus,  the  United  States  and  Italy  see  the  
largest  increases  in  the  Marginalized  /  Interns  group,  while  the  more  generous  welfare  states  in  France  
and  Norway  partially  ameliorated  the  pressures  confronting  this  younger  cohort.  
Table  2  masks  acquisition  of  homeownership,  a  major  lifecycle  milestone.  Table  3  thus  shows  
the  changing  level  of  homeownership  among  25  to  34  year  old  cohort  sub-­‐groups  from  1980  to  2010  
compared  with  the  change  in  the  general  rate  of  homeownership  in  our  thirteen  countries.  Assessing  
the  change  in  homeownership  rates  is  not  straightforward,  for  two  reasons.  First,  homeownership  
overall  rose  in  many  countries  as  states  liberalized  mortgage  markets  in  the  1990s,  lowering  the  barriers  
that  the  younger  cohort  faced  entering  the  homeownership  market.  This  could  mask  the  extent  of  the  
overall  decline  of  the  Launched  share,  just  as  increasing  mean  income  can  mask  increasing  inequality.  
Second,  mortgage  liberalization  contributed  to  rising  housing  prices,  with  contradictory  effects  on  the  
homeownership  rate  in  this  group.  On  the  one  hand,  rising  prices  pushed  some  of  the  Launchers  into  the  
Renter  group  and  some  of  the  Renter  group  out  into  the  Precariat.  On  the  other  hand,  as  Renters  exit  
this  group,  it  raises  the  relative  share  of  Launchers,  who  are  more  likely  to  own  homes.  We  adjust  for  
broader  changes  in  homeownership  to  properly  measure  the  trend.44  
Properly  adjusted,  the  share  of  home-­‐owning  Launcher  and  Renter  households  among  the  25  to  
34-­‐year  old  cohort  fell  relative  to  the  society-­‐wide  change  in  homeownership  (Column  3)  in  at  least  ten  
and  possibly  eleven  of  the  thirteen  countries.45  Finland  saw  a  minute  0.5%  increase  from  1980  to  2010  
versus  a  society  wide  0.4%  increase.  In  Norway,  the  other  exceptional  case,  younger  cohorts  saw  a  2.3%  
increase  that  lagged  the  even  larger  11.3%  society-­‐wide,  oil  revenue-­‐driven  increase  in  homeownership.  
This  shows  that  the  ideal  type-­‐derived  intuition  about  increasingly  difficult  launching  into  ownership  
holds  up.  Younger  households  dropped  out  of  the  combined  Launcher  and  Renter  categories,  and  
increasingly  found  themselves  locked  out  of  homeownership.  The  data  in  Tables  2  and  3  thus  reveal  a  
deteriorating  ability  in  the  25  to  34  year-­‐old  cohort  to  exit  and  attain  traditional  life-­‐cycle  milestones,  as  
                                               
43  We  use  France,  not  Germany,  because  Reunification  creates  an  irremediable  data  break  between  1990  and  
2000.  
44  We  adjusted  by  multiplying  the  homeownership  rate  among  the  Launcher  and  Renter  group  by  the  share  of  
Launchers  and  Renters  in  the  25  to  34-­‐year  old  cohort  in  1980  (or  1990)  and  in  2010,  and  then  subtracting  the  
earlier  data  point  from  the  later  one.  This  yields  the  change  in  the  Launcher  and  Renter  homeownership  share  in  
the  millennial  cohort.  This  number  can  then  be  compared  to  the  delta  in  society-­‐wide  homeownership.  Failing  to  
adjust  may  produce  an  apparent  but  misleading  increase  in  the  homeownership  share,  as  non-­‐homeowners  exit  
the  relevant  group,  shrinking  the  combined  renter  and  homeowner  denominator  in  the  fraction  while  leaving  the  
homeowner  numerator  unchanged.  
45  Missing  data  for  Sweden  in  1980  and  1990  make  it  impossible  to  assess  the  trend  accurately.  
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well  as  the  shrinking  proportion  of  younger  people  in  the  upper  half  of  the  income  distribution.  
  
  
  Table  2:  Trend  in  type  shares  of  25  to  34  year-­‐old  cohort,  1980-­‐2010,  four  select  welfare  regimes*  
   Living  Arrangements  




Launchers  /  Renters   Cautious  Savers  /  Pooled  Households  
     US   FR   NO   IT        US   FR   NO   IT  
1980   27.2   32.7   22.6   20.9   1980   5.6   5.1   8.5   18.5  
1990   21.7   28.3   19.1   16.4   1990   8.1   8.8   11.3   25.0  
2000   20.8   19.8   21.8   11.5   2000   6.4   7.7   6.9   27.9  








3.0   1.3   -­‐0.9   8.6  
         
Low  
Precariat  /  Trustafarians   Marginalized  /  Interns  
     US   FR   NO   IT        US   FR   NO   IT  
1980   62.3   56.2   63.1   42.7   1980   4.9   6.1   5.8   18.0  
1990   60.2   57.3   63.2   38.6   1990   10.0   5.6   6.4   20.0  
2000   63.0   66.1   68.0   33.0   2000   9.8   6.5   3.2   27.7  








7.7   0.2   -­‐1.7   9.0  
Source:  Authors’  construction  from  LIS  data;  average  sample  size  6006  households  
*  Cells  with  the  same  country  /  year  sum  to  100%  (thus  US  1980:  27.2  +  5.6  +  62.3  
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Table  3:    Change  in  share  of  millennial  cohort  groups,  level  of  homeownership  by  group,  and  change  in  national  level  
of  homeownership,  1980-­‐2010,  thirteen  OECD  countries  
   Launchers  /  Renters      Cautious  Savers  /  Pooled  Households  
  







rate     





Australia   -­‐1.6   -­‐4.7   -­‐3.1      2.7   2.6  
Denmark   -­‐18.0   -­‐16.0   -­‐14.3      3.9   1.5  
Finland   -­‐0.6   0.5   0.4      -­‐3.9   -­‐3.5  
France   -­‐8.5   -­‐0.8   4.0      1.3   1.0  
Germany   -­‐11.3   -­‐10.3   2.0      3.5   2.9  
Ireland*   -­‐0.9   -­‐4.0   -­‐10.7      -­‐1.2   -­‐1.6  
Italy   -­‐12.5   -­‐5.8   8.4      8.6   10.4  
Netherlands**   -­‐10.2   -­‐2.8   12.5      2.5   2.8  
Norway   -­‐2.7   2.3   11.6      -­‐0.9   -­‐0.1  
Spain   -­‐9.6   -­‐2.4   13.4      8.1   10.1  
Sweden***   -­‐1.9     n/a   2.0      1.1   n/a  
United  Kingdom   -­‐6.2   -­‐6.1   12.4      1.3   3.7  
United  States   -­‐7.6   -­‐8.2   -­‐1.7      3.0   2.4  
  
   Precariat  /  Trustafarians   The  Marginalized  /  Interns  
  






homeownership  rate     




Australia   -­‐5.6   -­‐11.4   -­‐3.1      4.6   3.7  
Denmark   10.1   -­‐7.3   -­‐14.3      3.9   0.7  
Finland   7.7   -­‐0.1   0.4      -­‐3.1   -­‐2.9  
France   7.0   -­‐3.5   4.0      0.2   -­‐1.0  
Germany   3.7   -­‐6.5   2.0      4.1   1.5  
Ireland*   -­‐0.3   -­‐16.8   -­‐10.7      2.4   3.4  
Italy   -­‐5.1   -­‐2.1   8.4      9.0   6.5  
Netherlands**   6.5   8.1   12.5      1.1   0.6  
Norway   5.2   5.5   11.6      -­‐1.7   -­‐0.6  
Spain   -­‐7.3   -­‐2.4   13.4      8.9   7.8  
Sweden***   0.7   n/a   2.0      0.1   n/a  
United  Kingdom   1.1   -­‐9.2   12.4      3.8   3.9  
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United  States   -­‐3.1   -­‐8.8   -­‐1.7      7.7   4.2  
Source:    Authors’  construction  from  LIS  data.  *  =  1994;  **  =  1990;  ***  =  2000  
  
4:  Precarious  pensions    
Just  as  rising  income  inequality  impedes  younger  households’  exit  and  acquisition  of  housing,  rising  
income  inequality  impedes  older  households’  exit  from  the  market  into  retirement  by  using  home  and  
other  real  estate  equity  as  a  pension  supplement  or  substitute.  Rising  income  inequality  and  rising  prices  
have  reversed  the  earlier  relationships  among  ownership  and  pensions.  Rather  than  acting  as  a  pension  
supplement,  housing  has  become  a  drain  on  household  finances  for  some.  Many  households  now  find  
that  accumulating  debt-­‐free  housing  competes  directly  with  pension  savings  as  mortgages  persist  into  
the  retirement  years.46  Put  simply,  cash-­‐constrained  households  increasingly  have  to  choose  between  
paying  the  mortgage  and  saving  for  retirement,  or  launching  their  children  and  saving  for  retirement.  
Partly  this  reflects  the  precise  timing  of  entry  into  ownership  for  older  households.  Sustained  
nominal  and  real  price  increases  in  many  countries  convinced  many  households  and  policy  makers  that  
housing  could  be  used  as  a  form  of  self-­‐insurance.  Yet  rising  prices,  at  least  until  the  2008  crash,  also  
seduced  older  homeowners  into  borrowing  against  home  equity  or  delaying  principal  repayment,  and  
thus  carrying  a  mortgage  into  retirement.  Though  some  older  households  tried  to  supplement  pensions  
with  rental  income  from  ownership  of  additional  houses,  this  of  course  blocked  some  younger  
household’s  access  to  ownership.    
The  older  cohort  can  be  broken  up  into  four  groups.  We  disaggregate  older  households’  degree  
of  cash  constraint  by  using  their  loan-­‐to-­‐value  ratio  (LTV  –  the  ratio  of  mortgage  debt  to  the  value  of  the  
mortgaged  property)  for  all  real  estate  owned  (on  the  vertical  axis)  and  by  the  absolute  value  of  all  real  
estate  owned  (on  the  horizontal  axis)  (Figure  2).  The  combined  LTV  for  all  real  estate  assets  tells  us  the  
degree  to  which  a  household  enjoys  both  lower  cash  outflows  for  housing  as  well  as  real  cash  inflows  
from  rental  property.  By  definition,  a  higher  LTV  implies  greater  net  cash  outflows,  because  a  household  
is  paying  actual  money  ‘rent’  to  the  bank  via  their  mortgage  payment.  The  absolute  value  of  real  estate  
assets  tells  us  the  degree  to  which  a  household  could  mobilize  extra  cash,  via  a  second  mortgage,  home  
equity  loan,  or  reverse  mortgage  to  supplement  or  substitute  for  pension  income,  or  to  help  launch  their  
children.  As  with  younger  cohorts  facing  re-­‐familialization  and  delayed  milestones,  weak  cash  flow  
pushes  three  quadrants  here  towards  re-­‐familialization  and  delayed  exit  into  retirement.    
Do  these  groupings  exist?  Table  4  shows  the  relative  share  across  these  groups  for  the  home-­‐
owning,  55  to  69  year-­‐old  population  in  the  five  countries  for  which  comparable  data  exist  in  the  new  
Luxembourg  Wealth  Study  (LWS).47  Fortunately  these  five  countries  encompass  most  of  the  traditional  
welfare  state  types.  The  first  two  indicators,  the  percentage  of  homeowners  in  each  group  who  carry  a  
mortgage  and  the  average  LTV  for  mortgagers,  tell  us  the  relative  degree  of  financial  stress  for  these  
households.  Median  real  estate  asset  value  indicates  the  potential  to  mobilize  cash  by  borrowing  against  
equity  as  well  control  over  rental  property.  The  percentage  of  households  owning  real  estate  beyond  
their  primary  residence  combined  with  the  relative  share  of  non-­‐primary  residence  assets  in  total  real  
estate  assets  more  finely  indicates  control  over  rental  property.  Finally,  the  last  two  indicators,  the  
percentage  of  households  in  each  group  with  rental  income  and  the  average  value  of  that  income,  
indicate  the  magnitude  of  the  income  stream  from  real  estate  and  the  distribution  of  ‘Generation  
Landlord’  across  these  groups.  Generation  Landlord  should  be  characterized  by  ownership  of  additional  
                                               
46  Harvard  University  Joint  Center  for  Housing  Studies,  “The  State  of  the  Nation’s  Housing  2014,”  (Cambridge:  
Harvard  University  JCHS,  2014),  p.  3;  online  at:  http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/sonhr14-­‐
color-­‐full.pdf    
47  LIS  Cross-­‐National  Data  Center  (n.d.)  Luxembourg  Wealth  Study  Database.  Luxembourg,  available  at  
http://www.lisdatacenter.org.  
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real  estate,  possibly  using  borrowed  money,  that  generates  substantial  rental  income.  
  
Figure  2:  Relative  ability  to  use  house  as  a  pension  substitute  /  supplement  
      Absolute  Home  Value  
      High   Low  
  

























Limited  imputed  rent  
and  no  income  stream  
  
4  
Housing  Stress  and  
Underwater  
  
No  imputed  rent;  no  
income  stream  
  
The  ideal  typical  Freeholder  in  quadrant  1  is  poised  to  exit  into  retirement  and  to  help  their  
children  launch.  Outside  of  the  United  States  and  Scandinavia,  most  have  paid  off  the  mortgage  debt  on  
high  value  houses.  Those  with  mortgage  debt  combine  low  LTVs  with  ownership  of  real  estate  assets  
with  a  high  market  value.  Finally,  many  have  rental  property  as  a  second  source  of  income.  If  desired,  
they  can  release  real  estate  equity  as  a  form  of  self-­‐insurance,  albeit  with  some  difficulty  in  illiquid  
mortgage  markets.48  The  very  high  percentage  of  owners  of  additional  properties,  the  high  share  of  
those  secondary  properties  in  total  real  estate  assets,  and  the  high  values  for  rental  income  indicate  that  
the  largest  share  of  Generation  Landlord  lives  in  this  quadrant  (except  in  Britain,  discussed  below,  and  
perhaps  Australia).    
Quadrant  2  contains  the  Over-­‐housed.  Their  low  housing  values,  rather  than  substantial  
lingering  debt,  block  meaningful  cash  out  of  home  equity.  For  example,  limited  home  equity  blocks  
access  to  reverse  mortgages.  But  rent-­‐free  living  allows  them  to  stretch  a  weaker  pension  farther.49  In  
the  worst  case,  this  group  has  insufficient  cash-­‐flow  to  maintain  their  dwelling.  The  subsequent  
deterioration  of  that  dwelling  further  inhibits  their  mobility  into  more  appropriately  sized  housing  by  
deterring  buyers.  Because  they  cannot  move  out  of  their  old  family  home,  they  block  younger  potential  
buyers’  access  to  housing  suitable  for  family  formation.  Although  as  many  as  a  third  of  this  group  owns  a  
second  property,  very  few  actually  receive  rental  income.  Many  of  the  properties  are  likely  to  be  true  
second  homes,  as  with  Scandinavian  hytter  or  sommerhuse.  The  lack  of  rental  income  distinguishes  the  
Over-­‐housed  from  the  Freehold  group.    
Quadrant  3  contains  the  Over-­‐Leveraged,  who  are  nearing  or  entering  retirement  with  high  
mortgage  debt,  and  thus  considerable  pressure  on  their  cash-­‐flow.  High  home  values  partially  offset  the  
dangers  created  by  high  mortgage  debt,  but  they  neither  can  use  their  house  as  a  vehicle  for  asset-­‐
based  welfare  nor  can  enjoy  rent-­‐free  living.  This  group  faces  difficult  choices  as  on-­‐going  mortgage  
                                               
48  Delfani,  De  Dekken,  and  De  Wilde,  “Home-­‐ownership  and  Pensions.”  
49  Francis  G.  Castles,  “The  Really  Big  Trade-­‐Off:  Home  Ownership  and  the  Welfare  State  in  the  New  World  and  the  
Old,”  Acta  Politica  33,  no.  1  (1998):  5-­‐19.  
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payments  necessitate  continued  employment.  Alternately,  they  could  downsize  to  a  smaller  dwelling  
with  a  proportionately  smaller  mortgage;  even  so,  the  mortgage  necessitates  employment  unless  a  
robust  pension  provides  enough  cash.  The  Over-­‐leveraged  are  trying  to  behave  the  same  way  as  the  
Freeholders  by  acquiring  secondary  properties.  But  lacking  Freeholder-­‐level  cash  flow,  they  must  borrow    
  
Table  4:  Descriptive  statistics  for  Home-­‐owning  Pensioners  by  ideal  type,  select  countries,  2010  




leveraged   Stressed  
Australia                 
  
(1)  %  of  home-­‐owning  
population  in  each  type   24.8   52.0   6.8   16.3  
   %  of  (1)  with  a  mortgage   18.1   10.0   93.3   97.7  
   average  LTV  for  mortgages  %   3.8   4.2   25.5   36.1  
   Median  home  value  *   $1,150,000   $400,000   $1,050,000   $400,000  
  
%  of  (1)  owning  secondary  
property   64.0   9.6   65.3   11.0  
  
Secondary  property  value/    
Total  property  value   46.0   37.2   48.5   37.4  
   %  of  (1)  with  rental  income   29.1   2.1   9.4   0.3  
   annual  rental  income     $19,892   $5,394   $12,289   $2,442  
Finland                   
  
(1)  %  of  home-­‐owning  
population  in  each  type   29.8   49.9   5.9   14.4  
   %  of  (1)  with  a  mortgage   16.0   9.3   100   100  
   average  LTV  for  mortgages  %   3.1   3.3   23.4   36.6  
   Median  home  value  *   €  395,566   €  132,644   €  345,814   €  119,080  
  
%  of  (1)  owning  secondary  
property   84.4   36.1   78.2   21.9  
  
Secondary  property  value/    
Total  property  value   49.4   36.0   45.5   37.5  
   %  of  (1)  with  rental  income   23.9   5.8   28.4   7.6  
   annual  rental  income     €  10,581   €  3,653   €  5,691   €  3,869  
Italy                   
  
(1)  %  of  home-­‐owning  
population  in  each  type   25.4   65.2   3.5   5.9  
   %  of  (1)  with  a  mortgage   4.2   2.9   62.1   64.0  
   average  LTV  for  mortgages  %   1.3   0.8   17.7   28.9  
   Median  home  value  *   €  550,000   €  200,000   €  480,000   €  200,000  
  
%  of  (1)  owning  secondary  
property   65.8   19.7   79.1   19.3  
  
Secondary  property  value/    
Total  property  value   38.7   27.1   37.6   25.7  
   %  of  (1)  with  rental  income   22   2.8   16.8   1.3  
   annual  rental  income     €  10,481   €  5,823   €  13,515   €3000**  
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leveraged   Stressed  
  
(1)  %  of  home-­‐owning  
population  in  each  type   23.8   51.7   7.9   16.7  
   %  of  (1)  with  a  mortgage   11.4   8.1   84.1   95.1  
   average  LTV  for  mortgages  %   4.0   4.8   33.4   37.3  
   Median  home  value  *   £400000   £165000   £405000   £165000  
  
%  of  (1)  owning  secondary  
property   27.4   4.2   35.5   6.2  
  
Secondary  property  value/    
Total  property  value   28.2   17.9   31.5   29.2  
   %  of  (1)  with  rental  income   14.6   3.4   29.7   7  
   annual  rental  income     £15275   £14114   £17997   £10959  
USA                   
  
(1)  %  of  home-­‐owning  
population  in  each  type   16.6   42.8   6.7   33.9  
   %  of  (1)  with  a  mortgage   46.2   28.6   92.9   97.2  
   average  LTV  for  mortgages  %   15.6   17.0   52.2   73.6  
   Median  home  value  *   $940,000   $150,000   $750,000   $165,000  
  
%  of  (1)  owning  secondary  
property   73.5   25.1   73.8   16.9  
  
Secondary  property  value/  
  Total  property  value   51.5   31.0   35.5   24.2  
   %  of  (1)  with  rental  income   n/a   n/a   n/a   n/a  
   annual  rental  income     n/a   n/a   n/a   n/a  
Source:  Authors’  construction  from  Luxembourg  Wealth  Study  database,  accessed  19  January  2017;  
average  sample  size  3063  households.  
  
to  do  so,  producing  the  observed  high  LTVs.  With  mortgage  payments  absorbing  rental  income,  these  
secondary  properties  only  weakly  serve  as  a  pension  substitute.  They  can  however,  help  launch  their  
children,  because  the  lack  of  rental  income  could  indicate  re-­‐familialization  as  parents  help  children  by  
purchasing  condos  or  apartments.  In  effect,  this  group  is  speculating  on  rising  property  values  to  help  
them  exit  into  retirement.  
Quadrant  4  experiences  housing  stress.  Nearly  all  have  a  mortgage.  Although  it  often  is  not  large  
relative  to  their  home  value  –  a  consequence  of  robust  price  appreciation  –  the  low  average  value  of  
their  property  prevents  home  equity  release.  Few  households  in  this  group  own  secondary  property.  A  
weak  pension  system  leaves  this  group  chronically  cash  short.  Here  we  would  expect  the  highest  
probability  of  re-­‐familialization  coming  from  the  parent’s  side,  as  we  can  see  in  the  United  States  where  
over  one-­‐third  of  households  fall  into  this  group.  By  2010,  about  one-­‐fifth  of  retirement  age  Americans  
were  living  with  adult  children,  an  increase  that  started  in  1980.50  Countries  with  more  robust  welfare  
states  have  fewer  households  in  this  category,  as  the  data  for  Finland  and  Australia  show.  Finally,  re-­‐
                                               
50  Paul  Taylor,  Jeffrey  Passel,  Richard  Fry,  Richard  Morin,  Wendy  Wang,  Gabriel  Velasco,  &  Daniel  Dockterman,  
“The  Return  of  the  Multi-­‐Generational  Family  Household,”  (Pew  Research  Center,  March  2010);  online  at:  
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familialization  in  Italy  shrinks  this  category  because  roughly  two-­‐fifths  of  the  elderly  live  with  their  
children,  a  rate  almost  half  again  as  high  as  the  G7  average.51  
These  data  imply  three  major  points  about  the  so-­‐called  Generation  Landlord.  First,  inequality  
generates  social  conflicts  that  are  not  primarily  generational  in  nature.  No  uniform  older  Generation  
Landlord  confronts  a  younger  Generation  Rent.  To  the  extent  that  Generation  Landlord  exists,  it  can  be  
found  in  varying  proportions  in  all  four  quadrants  of  Figure  2.  Three  of  those  groups  face  varying  
problems  of  exit  into  retirement,  while  only  the  Freeholder  group  –  which  admittedly  contains  a  higher  
proportion  of  landlords  –  has  a  secure  exit.  Second,  state  cultivation  of  generation  landlord-­‐type  
households  cannot  create  an  adequate  pension  replacement  for  near-­‐retirees,  because  most  
households  will  have  to  resort  to  mortgage  debt  to  buy  secondary  real  estate.  This  means  that  they  are  
essentially  resorting  to  what  Hyman  Minsky  called  speculative  finance  (where  rental  income  covers  
interest  payments  but  not  principal  repayment)  or  ponzi  finance  (where  rental  income  covers  neither  
interest  nor  principal  repayment),  and  relying  on  capital  gains  to  provide  additional  financial  resources  
in  retirement.52  But  real  house  prices  cannot  rise  indefinitely  if  younger,  home-­‐buying  cohorts  do  not  
have  rising  real  income.  The  exception  might  be  in  small  markets  experiencing  large  foreign  inflows,  as  is  
the  case  for  Australia,  where  nominal  housing  prices  still  defy  gravity.  
Third,  while  Britain  is  usually  thought  to  provide  the  best  example  of  both  Generation  Landlord  
as  a  social  phenomenon  and  as  a  state  sponsored  pension  supplement  strategy,  our  data  imply  that  the  
British  case  does  not  generalize.  Ronald  and  Kadi  show  that  the  number  of  private  British  landlords  has  
quadrupled  in  the  past  20  years,  such  that  roughly  6.5  percent  of  the  over  50  year-­‐old  cohort  now  owns  
rental  property.53  But  the  bulk  of  British  Generation  Landlord  lives  in  the  Over-­‐leveraged  group,  rather  
than  the  Freeholder  group  more  typical  of  other  countries.  British  households’  efforts  to  avoid  re-­‐
familialization  and  deal  with  the  increasing  fragility  of  pensions  rests  on  a  massive  bet  that  rising  housing  
prices  will  generate  capital  gains.    
Finally,  these  data  also  suggest  a  major  point  about  welfare  states  and  homeownership.  A  
robust  welfare  state  and  in  particular  comprehensive  pension  and  health  care  provision  both  enable  
homeownership  and  reduce  the  need  for  freehold  ownership  in  old  age.  Stable  incomes  before  
retirement  make  it  possible  to  service  a  mortgage;  secure  pensions  in  retirement  reduce  the  need  to  
own  secondary  property.  America’s  highly  stratified  and  stingy  welfare  state  puts  a  much  larger  share  of  
its  near  retirement  cohort  into  the  Stressed  group  as  compared  to  the  cases,  and  limits  the  share  of  the  
population  that  can  claw  its  way  into  the  Freehold  group.  Drilling  down  into  each  group  and  looking  at  
the  effects  of  discrimination  against  racial  and  ethnic  minorities  makes  this  clear,  because  these  groups  
typically  rely  more  on  the  overt  welfare  state.    
Tables  5  and  6  show  the  over  or  under-­‐representation  of  racial  and  ethnic  groups  in  our  four  
ideal  typical  near-­‐pension  groups  and  our  four  groupings  of  the  eight  younger  types.  Unsurprisingly,  
among  near-­‐pensioners  blacks  and  Hispanics  are  under-­‐represented  in  the  fortunate  Freeholder  group,  
whereas  whites  and  especially  Asians  are  overrepresented.  These  data  understate  the  disparity,  because  
all  households  in  our  four  groups  have  already  made  it  into  homeownership.  While  82%  of  US  white  
households  are  homeowners  by  the  age  of  55,  only  58%  of  black  households  are  homeowners.  Although  
racial  and  ethnic  minorities  (including  immigrants)  experience  greater  barriers  to  exit  into  retirement,  in  
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all  the  countries  for  which  we  have  data,  all  of  the  near  pensioners  in  groups  2,  3,  and  4  experience  
pressure  for  re-­‐familialization  and  difficulty  exiting,  just  as  the  younger  cohorts  in  the  parallel  groups  
face  barriers  to  enter  into  adulthood.  Blacks  and  minorities  are  under-­‐represented  to  a  similar  extent  in  
the  fortunate  Launched/Renter  youth  group.  This  is  even  more  true  of  black  and  Hispanic  youth  living  
with  their  parents,  where  the  lack  of  potential  parental  resources  can  be  seen  in  a  20  percentage  point  
difference  in  homeownership  rates  relative  to  whites  (LWS).  Moreover,  the  differences  between  older  
and  younger  black  cohorts  are  not  large,  suggesting  little  improvement  from  one  generation  to  the  next.      
But  these  are  not  independent  phenomena.  How  do  processes  operating  in  both  older  and  younger  
cohorts  interact?    
  
Table  5:  Ideal  types  by  race/ethnicity  in  the  United  States,  percentage  point  deviation  from  
average  group  share  
         By  ideal  type  
   Ownership    
Rate  (total)  
   Freeholders   Over-­‐
housed  
Overleveraged   Stressed  
Group  Share         17.8   41.1%   7.7%   33.4%  
White   82%      +  1.5   -­‐  2.1   +  0.8   -­‐  0.2  
Black   58%      -­‐  14.4   +  15.3   -­‐  5.1   +  4.2  
Hispanic   57%      -­‐  9.1   +  21.5   -­‐  4.8   -­‐  7.6  
Asian  and  Other   72%      +  16.2   -­‐  17.4   +  1.7   -­‐  0.5  
Source:  Luxembourg  Wealth  Study    
  
Table  6:  Ideal  types  by  race/ethnicity  in  the  United  States,  percentage  point  deviation  from  average  
group  share  
  
      By  ideal  type:   Ownership  rate:  













Group  Share      19.6%   8.7%   59.2%   12.5%        
White      +  4.9   +  0.1   -­‐  1.6   -­‐  3.4   71%   45%  
Black      -­‐  12.5   -­‐  2.0   +  8.7   +  5.8   53%   18%  
Hispanic      -­‐  8.5   -­‐  0.9   +  3.1   +  6.3   52%   28%  
Asian  and  
Other  
   +  2.9   +  5.1   -­‐  9.5   +  1.6   58%   23%  
Source:  Luxembourg  Income  Study    
  
5:    Feedback  loops  and  co-­‐constitutive  processes  
The  dynamics  in  the  younger  and  older  cohorts  combine  into  self-­‐sustaining  feedback  loops  and  co-­‐
constitutive  processes  operating  at  the  level  of  the  household  and  the  level  of  the  market.  Two  feedback  
loops  operate  at  the  household  level.  Both  involve  re-­‐familialization,  but  in  one  loop  children  rely  on  
parental  income,  and  in  the  other  the  reverse.  One  co-­‐constitutive  process  and  one  feedback  loop  
operate  at  the  level  of  the  market.  The  co-­‐constitutive  market  process  has  the  putative  generation  
landlord  on  one  side  and  renters  on  the  other.  The  feedback  loop  begins  with  older  households  with  
weak  pensions  who  find  it  financially  or  emotionally  difficult  to  exit  family-­‐appropriate  housing.  This  
reduces  the  supply  of  family-­‐sized  housing.  At  the  same  time,  re-­‐familialization  of  the  young  through  co-­‐
location  with  parents  makes  it  harder  for  older  sellers  to  find  younger  buyers.    
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We  have  already  sketched  out  the  first  re-­‐familialization  feedback  loop,  where  children  draw  on  
parental  resources,  above.  In  the  fordist  period,  insecurity  about  housing  produced  demands  for  
additional  state-­‐organized  social  welfare  and  social  housing,  rather  than  the  re-­‐familizalization  
observable  today.  But  now,  instead  of  housing  systems  moving  towards  the  greater  market  orientation  
and  mortgage  depth  that  used  to  characterize  the  anglo-­‐nordic  systems,  housing  tenure  and  finance  is  
moving  towards  a  more  ‘southern’  system  in  which  families  acquire  housing  to  protect  their  children’s  
short  and  long-­‐term  access  to  housing.  This  loop  links  the  younger  Launched,  Intern,  and  Marginalized  
mostly  with  the  older  Freeholder  quadrant  in  which  generation  landlord  is  more  prevalent.  In  the  
second  feedback  loop,  parents  rely  on  children’s  resources,  draining  potential  down  payment  savings.  
Parents  in  the  Stressed  quadrant  are  the  most  likely  to  do  so.  In  countries  as  varied  as  the  United  States,  
Italy,  and  Germany,  respectively  28  percent,  20  percent  and  18  percent  of  parents  over  the  age  of  65  
receive  financial  assistance  from  their  children.  That  said,  the  bulk  of  financial  assistance  still  flows  
‘downhill’  from  parents  to  children.  In  the  countries  just  mentioned,  it  is  two  to  three  times  as  likely  that  
parents  are  helping  children  financially  as  the  reverse.54  
At  the  market  level  a  co-­‐constitutive  process  links  younger  and  older  generations  and  renters  
and  landlords.  The  landlord-­‐renter  process  is  fundamentally  driven  by  the  behavior  of  the  older  
Freeholder  and  Over-­‐leveraged  groups.  These  people  are  consciously  choosing  to  become  landlords  to  
shore  up  potentially  inadequate  pensions  or  to  assure  their  own  children’s  access  to  housing.  This  dual  
hedge  is  particularly  pronounced  in  the  anglo-­‐economies,  which  have  many  smaller  private  landlords.  
On  the  one  hand,  they  (correctly)  fear  weaker  pensions  given  stock  market  volatility  and  a  twenty-­‐year  
history  of  attacks  on  public  pension  generosity.  On  the  other  hand,  particularly  in  the  nordics,  small  
landlords  see  an  extra  house  as  a  way  to  ease  their  own  children  into  an  extremely  expensive  housing  
market  before  price  appreciation  puts  housing  beyond  their  children’s  reach.  Often  this  starts  when  the  
child  is  still  a  student,  in  effect  putting  them  on  the  housing  ladder  before  they  are  even  employed.55  
This  strategy  paradoxically  also  increases  the  size  of  the  Renter  sub-­‐group.  Every  dwelling  controlled  by  
generation  landlord  implies  a  dwelling  occupied  by  Renters.    
A  feedback  loop  also  operates  in  the  market,  creating  housing  market  imperfections.  This  loop  
begins  with  older  households,  especially  those  falling  in  quadrants  2,  3,  and  4,  whose  inadequate  
pension  income  and  lower  net  housing  equity  for  the  Over-­‐leveraged  and  Stressed  groups  leads  them  to  
retain  housing  more  appropriate  for  younger  families.  This  in  effects  locks  up  that  segment  of  the  
housing  stock  for  potential  young  families.  These  unrealized  families  remain  in  the  original  nuclear  
household,  reducing  demand  for  this  kind  of  housing  in  the  short  term,  and  thus  reinforcing  their  
parents’  inability  to  exit.    
What  do  these  intersecting  dynamics  mean  for  housing  prices,  and  thus  the  subsequent  ability  
of  older  cohorts  to  exit  into  retirement  and  younger  cohorts  to  exit  the  parental  home?  Even  though  
younger  cohorts  remain  longer  in  the  parental  home,  this  reduction  in  demand  does  not  generate  the  
decrease  in  housing  prices  that  normal  supply  and  demand  models  would  predict,  for  three  reasons.  
First,  pent  up  demand  by  potential  family  formers  pushes  up  prices  for  those  few  houses  that  actually  
enter  the  market.  Adult  children  living  in  the  parental  home  still  want  to  enter  the  market  as  buyers,  so  
their  apparent  exit  from  the  market  is  not  a  real  exit  from  the  market.  Second,  buy-­‐to-­‐let  purchases  by  
generation  landlord  sustains  higher  prices.    
Normally,  higher  prices  would  equilibrate  downwards  as  potential  (young)  buyers  exited  the  
market.  But  on  the  demand  side,  older  households  bidding  for  investment  property  replace  the  lost  
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demand  from  younger  households  priced  out  of  the  market.  On  the  supply  side,  limits  on  available  land  
induce  builders  to  supply  the  biggest  and  most  expensive  houses  possible  in  order  to  maximize  profits.  
Thus,  in  the  US  market,  the  share  of  new  single-­‐family  homes  with  over  3000  square  feet  (about  300  
square  meters)  doubled  to  28%  from  the  1990s  to  2010s.  Conversely,  the  share  of  more  affordable  
starter  homes  under  2000  square  feet  has  fallen  from  52%  to  35%.56  In  principle  higher  prices  should  
induce  more  people  in  the  older  cohort  to  increase  supply  by  selling  their  old  family  homes.  But  even  
apart  from  the  emotional  attachment  that  people  have  to  their  family  home,  the  disaggregation  above  
indicates  that  many  in  the  older  cohort  will  not  realize  substantial  financial  gains  by  selling,  especially  
after  transaction  costs.  Moreover,  exiting  older  households  do  not  shift  demand  away  from  the  house  
segment  younger  cohorts  wish  to  occupy.  When  older  US  households  exit  their  family  home  they  do  not  
substantially  downsize.  The  average  selling  household  over  age  60  in  2015  shed  only  10%  of  the  original  
space  of  their  prior  home,  and  reduced  the  nominal  value  of  their  home  by  only  5%.57  Finally,  third,  in  
the  anglo-­‐OECD  markets  with  the  biggest  buy-­‐to-­‐let,  generation  landlord  phenomenon,  foreign  
investment  inflows  provide  an  exogenous  source  of  demand  that  pushes  up  regional  and  national  
average  house  prices.58    
Growing  income  and  wealth  inequality  thus  creates  dynamics  that  lead  to  generational  and  class  
conflict  in  the  housing  market  that  in  turn  reinforces  that  income  and  wealth  inequality.  Efforts  by  
better  off  groups  in  the  older  cohort  to  self-­‐insure  themselves  via  property  ownership  create  more  
housing  insecurity  for  lower  income  groups  and  younger  cohorts.  This  also  has  a  class  polarizing  effect  
inside  younger  cohorts,  as  only  parents  with  higher  incomes  can  afford  to  give  their  children  access  to  
secure  housing.  And  over  the  long  run,  given  the  centrality  of  housing  wealth  in  the  average  person’s  
portfolio,  this  means  less  wealth  formation  for  the  millennial  cohort  compared  to  previous  generations,  
along  with  greater  wealth  disparities  within  it.  And  as  noted  above,  this  is  true  with  even  greater  force  
for  racial  and  ethnic  minority  groups.  Equalizing  the  homeownership  rate  for  blacks  and  latinos  in  the  
United  States  would  do  more  to  equalize  household  wealth  than  equalizing  the  shares  of  the  population  
with  higher  education.59  
  
6:  Inequality,  housing,  households,  and  the  future  
Rising  income  inequality  is  mediated  through  housing  markets  in  different  countries  to  produce  three  
new  inequalities:    unequal  access  to  housing,  unequal  access  to  launch  and  form  families  and  unequal  
access  to  stable  and  adequate  pensions.  Many  people  now  face  difficulty  transitioning  into  what  had  
been  the  socially  accepted  next  stage  of  life:  parenthood  and  independence  for  the  young,  and  for  the  
old  entry  into  retirement  or  retirement  at  the  same  standard  of  living.  Households  have  responded  to  
these  new  realities  not  with  the  expected  Polanyian  countermovement  in  favor  of  more  state-­‐supplied  
welfare,  but  rather  in  different  ways  depending  on  their  different  generational  and  class  (or  
employment)  locations.  These  variegated  responses  fragment  households  across  and  within  
generational  cohorts  to  produce  the  heterogeneous  groups  described  above,  even  though  they  all  share  
a  common  strategy  of  re-­‐familialization  as  a  form  of  self-­‐protection  from  the  consequences  of  rising  
                                               
56  Data  reported  in  Bill  McBride,  Calculated  Risk  Blog;  online  at    
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2016/06/lawler-­‐single-­‐family-­‐home-­‐production-­‐in.html.  
57  National  Association  of  Realtors,  “2015  National  Association  of  Realtors  Home  Buyer  and  Seller  Generational  
Trends,”  (Washington  DC:  NAR,  2015),  pp.  90,  92;  online  at:  
https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/reports/2015/2015-­‐home-­‐buyer-­‐and-­‐seller-­‐generational-­‐trends-­‐2015-­‐
03-­‐11.pdf.  
58  Herman  Mark  Schwartz,  Subprime  Nation  (Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  University  Press,  2009).    
59  Laura  Sullivan,  Tatjana  Meschede,  Lars  Dietrich,  &  Thomas  Shapiro,  The  Racial  Wealth  Gap:  Why  Policy  Matters  
(New  York,  NY:  Demos,  2016);  Online  at  
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inequality.  Paradoxically  re-­‐familialization  self-­‐defense  strategies  create  feedback  loops  or  co-­‐
constitutive  processes  that  exacerbate  the  very  inequalities  initially  driving  those  strategies.    
What  are  the  consequences  of  these  processes,  what  are  possible  policy  responses,  and  what  is  
the  path  for  future  research?  Re-­‐familialization  has  four  major  policy-­‐relevant  consequences.  First,  
delayed  household  formation  and  reduced  demand  for  market-­‐based  housing  by  new  young  households  
reduces  aggregate  demand,  exacerbating  the  weak  employment  markets  that  keep  young  people  in  
their  parents’  home.  While  the  residential  capital  formation  rates  that  immediately  preceded  the  recent  
financial  crises  were  unsustainable,  the  current  depressed  levels  of  residential  investment  are  a  drag  on  
economic  growth  and  employment.  OECD-­‐wide  gross  fixed  capital  formation  has  fallen  from  20.2  
percent  of  GDP  in  mid-­‐2006  to  17.6  percent  in  early  2014.60  Housing  remains  a  major  driver  of  the  
business  cycle  and  economic  growth,  but  slower  household  formation  retards  a  rebound  from  the  crises.  
Second,  the  ability  to  pursue  multiple  life-­‐cycle  goals  simultaneously  is  unequally  shared  within  
the  millennial  cohort.  This  paper  focused  on  the  ability  of  younger  cohorts  to  form  households,  a  crucial  
step  in  social  and  population  reproduction.  But  because  access  to  housing  rests  on  unequal  access  to  
parental  resources,  those  segments  of  the  younger  cohort  who  lack  such  resources  will  have  greater  
difficulties  reconciling  their  preferred  housing  outcomes  with  their  preferred  partnership  outcomes.  
Those  who  want  to  become  homeowners  without  partnering  may  find  it  impossible  to  achieve  either  
without  parental  support,  reinforcing  the  inequality  in  their  initial  starting  position.  While  sharing  a  
rental  unit  or  pooling  income  and  savings  with  a  partner  to  afford  a  down  payment  might  be  enough  to  
overcome  the  absence  of  parental  support,  it  further  divides  the  younger  cohort  across  traditional  
cleavages  like  class  and  gender.  Women  who  want  to  remain  independent  from  a  male  partner  may  be  
able  to  so  if  they  are  part  of  the  Launched  for  instance,  but  not  if  they  are  part  of  the  Precariat.  This  
increased  differentiation  within  the  cohort  is  likely  to  ramify  through  future  generations  because  of  
assortative  mating  and  subsequent  growing  income  and  wealth  inequalities.  Unsurprisingly,  recent  
immigrants  and  racial  minorities,  who  already  have  lower  average  incomes,  more  volatile  employment,  
and  less  home  ownership,  experience  these  negative  wealth  and  re-­‐familialization  effects  most  strongly.  
In  addition,  rising  economic  stress  and  fear  about  the  difficulty  of  social  and  generational  reproduction  
may  be  fueling  the  quasi-­‐populist  voter  revolts  seen  not  only  in  Brexit  and  the  election  of  Donald  Trump,  
but  also  in  the  rising  share  of  anti-­‐establishment  parties.  
Third,  individually  rational  behaviors  are  producing  collectively  irrational  outcomes  by  
exacerbating  the  underlying  inequality  dynamics  producing  re-­‐familialization  and  insecurity.  The  more  
that  Freeholders  secure  housing  and  good  employment  for  their  children,  the  more  insecure  pensions,  
employment  and  housing  access  become  for  Renters,  for  the  even  weaker  Marginalized,  and  for  their  
struggling  parents.  This  polarization  perpetuates  and  intensifies  already  acute  class  and  racial  
inequalities.  Unfortunately,  public  policy  currently  reinforces  this  trend  through  its  emphasis  on  asset-­‐
based  welfare  and  fiscal  austerity.  Marketization  and  individuation  of  pensions  will  most  likely  lead  to  
lower  long-­‐term  returns  and  greater  risks  for  pensioners.  This  conflicts  with  pensioners’  ability  to  fund  a  
mortgage  into  their  early  retirement  years  precisely  at  the  point  in  time  when  delayed  household  
formation  pushes  amortization  of  a  mortgage  later  in  life.  Pursuit  of  austerity  in  a  low  interest  rate  
environment  encourages  higher  income  earners  to  divert  savings  into  real  estate  as  the  only  viable  
investment.  And  slow  growth  locks  young  cohorts  into  marginal  employment,  especially  for  groups  
outside  a  given  country’s  ethno-­‐national  core.  
Possible  policy  responses  include  fiscal  expansion,  a  stabilization  of  existing  welfare  programs  
and  a  renewed  state  role  in  housing.  Fiscal  expansion  would  help  create  a  more  robust  job  market  that  
in  turn  would  enable  younger  cohorts  to  exit  the  parental  home  or  reduce  their  reliance  on  parental  
resources.  In  particular,  creating  a  green  economy  or  renovating  aging  infrastructure  seem  like  obvious  
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targets  for  public  spending.  Additionally,  easing  regulations  that  ratchet  up  the  costs  of  housing  (e.g.  
transaction  costs)  will  help  both  younger  would-­‐be  buyers  and  older  would-­‐be  sellers.  Marketization  of  
pensions  and  the  shift  towards  defined  contribution  pensions  have  introduced  new  risks  rather  than  
diminished  the  risks  of  exiting  the  labor  market.  More  equitable  public  pensions  in  Italy  or  France,  and  
more  generous  public  pensions  in  the  United  States  or  Britain,  would  both  stabilize  older  cohorts’  
incomes  and  add  to  aggregate  demand.  A  renewed  public  push  for  homebuilding  and  rehabilitation  will  
also  expand  supply  and  thus  decrease  prices.  
Most  generally,  the  fragmentation  of  the  millennial  and  near  retirement  cohorts  can  be  seen  as  
the  social  side  of  the  increasing  income  and  wealth  inequality  that  Piketty  and  others  document.61  Much  
of  the  unequal  accumulation  of  wealth  occurs  through  possession  of  real  estate.  It  is  thus  unsurprising  
that  strategies  of  defense  involve  households  returning  to  configurations  more  typical  of  the  period  
before  the  historically  unusual  post-­‐war  ‘golden  era.’  Polanyi  was  surely  correct  about  the  corrosive  
effects  of  the  market.62  But  counter-­‐movements  are  political  in  nature,  and  most  academics  forget  that  
the  counter-­‐movements  Polanyi  described  were  not,  at  first,  benign  efforts  to  shelter  everyone.  Like  
today’s  populist  outbursts,  they  most  often  sought  to  shelter  ethno-­‐national  core  populations  by  
backing  authoritarians  who  promised  to  control  markets.  In  the  context  of  today’s  increasingly  brutal  
politics,  it  is  thus  also  not  surprising  that  families  are  seeking  shelter  from  the  market  by  huddling  
together  in  their  remaining  shelters.    
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